BASES OF POWER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND OUTCOMES OF MERGERS: THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS OF INFLUENCE TACTICS

HERMAN STEENSMA
Leiden University, The Netherlands

FEMKE van MILLIGEN
Nanni Studio, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Nine firms combined into one larger company. After the merger, managers and staff members ($N = 84$) filled out questionnaires measuring the influence tactics they used, their bases of power, and outcomes and procedural justice aspects of the merger. Backstage influence tactics, though neglected by most theorists, were used rather frequently. Several hypotheses were stated about the relationship between, on the one hand, outcomes, justice aspects, and bases of power, and on the other hand the influence tactics used. Most hypotheses were partly supported. As had been predicted, position power enhances the probability that hard tactics (pressure, legitimizing, coalition formation) are used. Position power also enhances the probability of using backstage tactics. Negative outcomes may lead to the use of backstage influence tactics. Procedural justice covaries with a high frequency of soft tactics (consultation, inspirational appeals, ingratiation), but justice aspects like "voice" and "adequate information" do not exclude the possibility that backstage tactics are used by actors. Several other findings are discussed.

Leaders use specific types of behavior to exercise influence. Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson tried to classify the several influence tactics [1]. They reduced 370 influence tactics to a small number of categories: assertiveness, rationality, ingratiation, exchange, coalition, upward appeal, blocking, and finally, the use of sanctions. Other researchers also explored influence tactics, and they all arrived at

a more or less similar system [see, for example, 2-9]. Some new categories were added to the list by Yukl and Falbe, namely, inspirational appeals (i.e., the appeal to values, norms, desirable ideas), and consultation (i.e., involving the target person in the process of planning and implementing actions) [4].

Most researchers focused on the use of influence tactics in organizations. However, there are also studies that focus on friends and family [10], strangers [11], and intergroup contexts [12]. Many studies of influence tactics focus on descriptive research questions: identification and categorization of the most frequently used influence tactics, sometimes including the identification of the consequences of these tactics. Recently, researchers also developed an interest in the determinants of the use of influence tactics. It has been found, for example, that the use of influence tactics covaries with the direction (upward, downward, lateral) of the influence attempt [1, 4, 5, 13, 14]. Personality factors also seem to be important: People scoring high on Machiavellianism use other tactics than do people scoring low on Machiavellianism [15-17].

It has also been found that the use of influence tactics covaries with factors like self-esteem [18], status [19], leadership style [20], educational level [15], people influencing a group or an individual [11], work values [21], ingroup-outgroup categorization of target [12], organizational culture [22], agent expertise and issue importance [23], the various objectives of influence attempts [1, 24], the expectation of future interaction [25]. Some authors have developed cost-benefit models to explain why some influence tactics are preferred to other tactics [5, 26, 27].

RESEARCH TOPIC

The present research was conducted to answer the question: "Which tactic will be used and why?" In principle, this question is both descriptive and explanatory. As for the descriptive part, however, it should be noted that the categorizations of tactics which have been presented so far seem to omit a very important category: the category of more or less sneaky, "backstage" tactics. Influence tactics as discussed by most authors could be called "frontstage" tactics. Some authors have pointed out that many attempts to influence the behavior of persons are performed backstage [28-31]. In such cases, target people are *not* aware of influence attempts by actors! Backstaging behavior was described, for example, as ". . . the politicking, the wheeler-dealing, the fixing and negotiating, the coalition building and the trade-offs, which typically cannot be openly discussed in the organization without damaging individual credibility or the legitimacy of the change attempt . . ." [29].

The present study explicitly includes backstage behaviors in the domain of influence tactics to be studied. This adds, of course, to the complexity of the categorization of influence tactics. On the other hand, it is possible to simplify the existing categorization of frontstage influence tactics. These tactics seem to differ

on a hard-soft dimension [12, 32-33]. Hard tactics allow the actor to take control over the situation and the target, and don't allow the target any latitude in choosing whether to comply [33]. According to their place on the hard-soft dimension, the frontstage influence tactics may be clustered into groups to reflect a higher-order categorization of influence tactics.

The category of "hard" tactics consists of the relatively controlling and coercive tactics. The "soft" category consists of tactics that allow the target more freedom to choose whether or not to comply. It is, of course, possible to distinguish an "in-between" category of tactics that are not very controlling/coercive, and not very soft, either. In the present study, pressure (assertiveness), legitimizing, and coalition formation are categorized as hard tactics, while inspirational appeals, consultation, and ingratiation are (more or less) soft tactics. Three tactics could not be categorized easily, and they will be studied separately: personal appeals, rational persuasion, and negotiating tactics.

The threshold to use hard influence tactics may be higher than the threshold to use soft tactics. Hard-influence tactics will be experienced as disagreeable by targets. This implies that the target-agent relationship may suffer from the use of hard-influence tactics, even though these tactics might have the effects intended by the actor. People may employ soft tactics more or less as a "default option." Whether they will use hard tactics may be more contingent on considerations regarding the side effects of the use of hard tactics [32]. However, in competitive contexts and in situations where it is rather unclear how positive and negative outcomes will be distributed or allocated to the people involved, it is tempting to use hard-influence tactics. Such situations contain what might be called "pull factors," i.e., factors that motivate persons to prefer some influence tactics to other ones. The same reasoning is more or less applicable to the use of backstage tactics by actors. For, even though targets are not aware of the fact that these tactics are used by the actor, the actor knows all too well that the targets will get angry when they find out what is going on. Therefore, actors will restrict their use of such sneaky tactics to situations where it is very important to them to gain positive outcomes.

Organizational mergers and acquisitions (M&A), often characterized by many uncertainties, are fine examples of such situations. The present research was done in an organization that was created a few months earlier as a result of a merger involving many small professional profit organizations. Managers of the new organization were busy, not only doing their daily job, but they were also often involved in the process of trying to maintain or create a desirable management position. The postmerger process of integration is an uncertain period for nearly all employees and managers.

MERGERS

Mergers and acquisitions have been studied by academics and professionals from several disciplines. One of the best-known studies was written by Haspeslagh

and Jemison [34]. They identified four schools of thought, each with its own theoretical roots, objective function, and central assumptions and propositions [see also 35]. The research stream of "financial economics," also called the "capital market school" focuses on wealth creation for shareholders and for the economy as a whole. The "strategic management school" pays special attention to the performance of the acquiring and acquired firms. The "organizational behavior" school of thought is interested in the impact of M&A on individuals and on organizational cultures. Acculturation theory plays a central role, and it is postulated that congruence between the cultures of merged organizations will result in higher employee satisfaction and effective integration.

Finally, the "process perspective" studies the creation of value by task integration after the merger and proposes that the actions of management, combined with the process of integration, determine the extent to which benefits of M&A may be realized. The present study combines elements from the organizational behavior approach and the process perspective.

OUTCOMES AND PROCEDURES

Many models of decision behavior share the basic assumption that people strive for alternatives with the highest expected utilities [36-39]. Or, at least, people want to optimize the number of outcomes, i.e., they want to have a satisfactory level of the outcomes available. According to this model of human behavior, people carefully weigh the expected costs against expected rewards. If the net-utility, i.e., the difference between the sum of expected (or perceived) rewards and the sum of the expected or perceived negative outcomes is low, people will be dissatisfied. Of course, they want to prevent dissatisfaction. This implies that the threshold for choosing backstage influence tactics will be low in situations where the (expected, respectively experienced) sum of outcomes is low. In such stressful situations they will be tempted to use hard influence tactics, too. It is generally believed that people in stressful situations where they run the risk of losing outcomes, will fight with all possible means to reach a satisfactory level of outcomes. Therefore, our hypotheses are:

Hypothesis I-A: *The more negative the (experienced or expected) personal (own) outcomes of the merger are for a person, the more frequently this person will use backstage influence tactics.*

Hypothesis I-B: *The more negative the personal (own) outcomes of the merger are for a person, the more frequently this person will use hard influence tactics.*

However, satisfaction of people in situations where outcomes are distributed or allocated is affected not only by the quantity and quality of the outcomes, but also by the *procedures* used in such situations. Or, to be more exact, *procedural justice* influences the satisfaction and motivation of people. But what, then, are the

criteria of procedural justice? There are many theories of procedural justice [see, for example, 40-45]. However, many authors seem to recognize that the concept of "voice" is of central importance in procedural justice. People want to have a say; this guarantees concern for their needs and consideration of their views. At the same time, having a voice symbolizes that one is seen as a valuable, worthy person, belonging to the group or organization, and having respectable standing.

Another aspect may influence the experience of procedural fairness. It is a well-known fact in organizational change projects that keeping people well-informed is a necessary condition for the successful implementation of changes [46]. Still, this aspect of *adequate notice* or *advance notice* has been somewhat neglected by many researchers, although recently attention has been paid to this factor in several studies—in particular, in studies that focused on performance appraisal [47-52].

It may be assumed that in situations where people perceive that procedural justice standards are applied, people will feel less necessity to use backstage tactics and/or hard influence tactics. As the procedures are fair, they will have a fair opportunity to convince others to pay attention to their needs and wishes. And soft tactics will be sufficient to reach this goal. Therefore, our hypotheses are:

Hypothesis II-A: *The more voice concerning the merger is given to persons, the less frequently they will use backstage influence tactics.*

Hypothesis II-B: *The more voice concerning the merger is given to persons, the less frequently they will use hard tactics, and the more frequently they will use soft tactics.*

Hypothesis II-C: *The more information/adequate notice concerning the merger is given to persons, the less frequently they will use backstage influence tactics.*

Hypothesis II-D: *The more information/adequate notice concerning the merger is given to persons, the less frequently they will use hard tactics, and the more frequently they will use soft tactics.*

BASES OF POWER

Influence tactics of leaders and employees have frequently been studied within the theoretical framework widely known as the "bases of social power." Social influence is the *potential* to change beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of a person or a group of persons. Four decades ago, French and Raven proposed a typology of bases of social power [53]. They distinguished between five bases of social power:

- reward power, or the ability to reward;
- coercive power (sometimes also called punishment power), where the ability to punish serves as the basis for power;

- legitimate power, the power resulting from having a legitimate right to influence other persons;
- referent power; a person (or a group) toward whom you are highly attracted has referent power. Sometimes persons with high referent power are unaware of their basis of power;
- expert power, varying with the extent of the knowledge or expertise [53].

In later studies, informational power, based on the information that influencing agents can present to the target, was added to this list [18, 54]. Other bases were suggested by other authors, but the six bases presented so far continue to be the most frequently studied power bases.

Some bases of power share similarities. Legitimate, reward, and coercive power all are aspects of the power sanctioned by an organization or by the leader's position in the organization. Therefore, one may speak of *position power* [55, 56]. Referent and expert power are two types of *personal power* that stem from the individual's personal attributes [53, 56, 57]. Bases of power can be seen as "push" factors. Persons who have a particular basis of power available, can be "pushed" by that basis to exercise a particular kind of attempt to influence. Indeed, some authors have explicitly suggested that the frequency with which an influence tactic is used in a particular direction is at least partly determined by the possession of the appropriate power basis for use of that tactic [5, 56]. Apparently, various bases of power are related to particular forms of influence tactics. Hard tactics involve the use of authority and position power. Generally, it may be expected that position power is positively related to the use of hard influence tactics, while soft tactics may result from personal power. However, as was noted before, persons who have referent power are not always aware of their power. So, it is possible that they don't have to use influence tactics at all: There is no need to do so, since other persons try to please them by behaving in a way they—the persons with high referent power—seem to like.

As for information power, this basis shares characteristics with both position power and personal power. Sometimes an agent has a position that allows him/her have access to lots of other persons and sources of information. But often, personal characteristics of the agent highly determine his/her informational power base. All in all, the analysis of bases of power leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis III: *Expert power will covary positively with the use of soft influence tactics.*

Hypothesis IV: *Referent power will covary positively with the use of soft influence tactics.*

Hypothesis V: *Legitimate power will covary positively with the use of hard influence tactics.*

Hypothesis VI: *Coercive power will covary positively with the use of hard influence tactics.*

Availability of reward power presents us with a theoretical dilemma. It is a form of position power, so it could be predicted to covary positively with the use of hard tactics. At the same time, rewards often are perceived as powerful motivators. This could be a reason for agents to use milder forms of influence tactics on the targets. But of course, agents can use rewards to manipulate, too. Therefore:

Hypothesis VII: *Reward power will covary positively with the use of hard influence tactics.*

This study also explores the correlation between reward power and the use of soft tactics, as well as the relationship between information power and the influence tactics.

How about the relationship between bases of power and the use of backstage tactics? Legitimate, coercive, and reward power will covary with the use of backstage tactics. Though backstage tactics are, by definition, not identical to hard tactics, they certainly share more characteristics with hard tactics than they share with soft tactics. For example, if targets find out that agents use backstage tactics, they will dislike the agent for doing so—and the use of hard, frontstage tactics also may induce negative attitudes toward the agent. Therefore:

Hypothesis VIII: *Legitimate power will covary positively with the use of backstage tactics.*

Hypothesis IX: *Coercive power will covary positively with the use of backstage tactics.*

Hypothesis X: *Reward power will covary positively with the use of backstage tactics* (assuming, here, that the position power aspect of reward power dominates).

As for expert power and referent power, in accordance with the analysis so far, these bases of power should not covary with backstage tactics. Even though affirming the null hypothesis creates a danger of making a statistical Type-II error (the error of failing to detect real effects) [58], it seems safe to predict that:

Hypothesis XI: *Expert power does not covary with the use of backstage tactics.*

Hypothesis XII: *Referent power does not covary with the use of backstage tactics.*

Finally, an educated guess about the frontstage tactics that do not belong to one of the meta categories of hard or soft tactic: Since it is expected generally that

experts have expert knowledge, and since targets expect and accept that experts judiciously use their knowledge, it is predicted that:

Hypothesis XIII: *Expert power covaries positively with the use of rational persuasion.*

METHODS

Subjects and Procedure

Questionnaires (110) were sent to all (middle) managers and staff members working in a company specialized in integrated services: design, engineering, project management, and feasibility studies in construction and real estate. The company has clients both in the public sector (the majority of clients) and in the private sector.

The company, with 800 employees, was founded shortly before the start of the present study, as a result of a merger between nine smaller firms. The effective response rate was 76 percent ($N = 84$). Mean age of respondents was 42 years (with a range from 22-61 years). Mean number of years having worked for one of the merged firms was 9.39 years, with a range from 0-35 years.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was divided into sections.

Influence Tactics

Frontstage influence tactics were measured by 38 items, pulled from the Dutch Influence Behavior Questionnaire [6]. The tactics measured are 1) hard tactics (pressure, legitimizing, coalition formation); 2) soft tactics (consultation, ingratiation, inspirational appeals), 3) other tactics: personal appeals, rational persuasion, negotiating tactics.

A sample item reads: (consultation) "I tell the person what I am trying to accomplish and ask if s/he knows any way to do it."

Scores on all items range from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). Also, for each separate tactic, summed scores were divided by the number of items. This resulted in scales with, again, a range of scale values from 1 to 5.

Backstage influence tactics were measured by 16 items. Eight items were developed especially for the present study, the other eight items were pulled out from an already existing Dutch instrument [31].

A sample item reads: "I arrange agenda setting in a way that guarantees a tactical order of considering my points."

Scores on all backstage items range from 1 (never) to 5 (very often).

Bases of Power

Sixteen statements were made, based on the categorization of bases of power by French and Raven: legitimate power; reward power; coercive power; referent power; expert power; informational power [18, 53]. Respondents had to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each statement on a 5-point scale from 1 = absolutely disagree to 5 = absolutely agree.

A sample item reads: (reward power) "I have a say in giving a bonus or a salary raise to a person."

To compute a score on each basis of power, scores on items composing the scale were totaled and then divided by the number of items.

Outcomes of Merger for Person

Each respondent evaluated the outcomes of the merger for him/herself as a person on a 5-point scale, from 1 = very positive to 5 = very negative.

Procedural Justice

Voice was measured by the item "I had much say in matters concerning the merger." Respondents had to indicate their agreement with this statement on a 5-point scale, from 1 = absolutely disagree to 5 = absolutely agree.

Adequate notice or *"Information"* was measured by the extent to which the respondent agreed with the statement: "I received adequate, good information about the merger" (5-point scale, from 1 = absolutely disagree to 5 = absolutely agree).

Other Items

Respondents had to answer a few items concerning demographic data and their job history.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Data Structure

A principal component analysis, followed by VARIMAX rotation was applied to the items measuring backstage influence tactics. This resulted in a three-component solution. Factor I, with an eigenvalue of 4.77 explained 29.8 percent of variance. The factor was labeled politicking, and eight items loaded high on this component. Sample items are: "I arrange agenda setting in a way that guarantees a tactical order of considering my points"; "I make an appeal to higher authorities, to support my proposals." Cronbach's alpha reliability of the politicking scale was a high .79.

Factor II, with six items, had an eigenvalue of 1.69. Most items shared an element of manipulation. A sample item reads: "I reformulate a proposal in such a way that it seems more attractive." Another sample item is: "I try to be the wirepuller behind the show."

Cronbach's alpha reliability of the scale was .75. Finally, the third factor, with an eigenvalue of 1.51, was formed by two items sharing the common aspect of having good social contacts and informal meetings with colleagues and bosses after working hours. The label socializing/networking seems to cover this method to influence others. A sample item read: "I discuss plans concerning the organization after hours with my colleagues and/or my boss." Cronbach's alpha reliability was .67, which is very high for a two-item scale. All scales measuring classic frontstage influence tactics demonstrated acceptable reliabilities. Table 1 presents mean scores and Cronbach's alpha reliabilities of all influence tactics.

From Table 1 we can learn, first, that there are several different ways to influence people backstage. And secondly, that managers and staff members use backstage tactics at least as frequently as they use many frontstage tactics. Actually, rational persuasion, soft tactics, and manipulation seem to be the three most popular influence tactics, while the frontstage tactic of negotiation was the least popular one. So the relative lack of attention to backstage tactics by many researchers cannot be defended by claiming that these tactics are hardly used in organizations.

As for the instruments measuring the bases of power, most scales demonstrated acceptable reliabilities. However, one item had to be removed from the scale measuring referent power. This integrity item ("In the eyes of my colleagues I am an incorruptable person who can be trusted.") was studied separately. Also, the scale for "informational power" had to be split up since the two items which were

Table 1. Influence Tactics: Mean Scores and
Cronbach Alpha Reliabilities

Influence tactics	Mean score	Cronbach's alpha reliability
1. Politicking	2.25	.79
2. Manipulating	2.98	.75
3. Socializing	2.54	.67
4. Hard tactics	2.59	.66
5. Soft tactics	3.19	.72
6. Personal appeals	2.14	.68
7. Rational persuasion	3.75	.73
8. Negotiation	1.91	.62

supposed to measure this basis of power didn't correlate significantly ($r = 0.5$, N.S.). One item, "information" is measuring the amount of nontechnical information needed to finish tasks; the other item, social networking, focuses on the social contacts enabling managers and staff to gather useful information about developments in the organization. Mean scores and Cronbach's alpha reliabilities of the scales and items measuring the bases of power are presented in Table 2.

Intercorrelations between Influence Tactics

Before testing the hypotheses, it is interesting to take a closer look at the correlations between all influence tactics (see Table 3).

From Table 3 it can be seen at a single glance that almost all correlations between the influence tactics studied in the present research project are positive. Moreover, of the 28 intercorrelations, 23 (i.e., 82 percent) reach a level of statistical significance. Apparently, people who are inclined to use one influence tactic also have a tendency to use other influence tactics just as much. So there seem to be individual differences between persons in the frequencies with which they try to influence others. Moreover, people "generalize" over tactics. For example, people who use soft tactics rather frequently also tend to have higher scores on the frequency of use of politicking, manipulation, socializing, hard tactics (!), personal appeals, rational persuasion, and negotiation. Still, the correlations, although reaching significant levels, are never perfect, so there is room for other factors to affect the frequency of use of influence tactics. These other factors are like the ones that were hypothesized to have effects, according to the hypotheses developed previously.

Table 2. Bases of Power: Mean Scores and
Cronbach Alpha Reliabilities

Bases of power	Mean score	Cronbach's alpha reliability
Expert	3.89	.72
Referent	3.71	.73
Integrity	4.22	—
Legitimate	3.76	.60
Coercive	2.95	.64
Reward	3.41	.83
Information	3.71	—
(Social) networking	3.58	—

Table 3. Correlations between Frontstage and Backstage Influence Tactics

Tactics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Politicking	1.00							
2. Manipulating	.54**	1.00						
3. Socializing	.21	.24*	1.00					
4. Hard tactics	.72**	.61**	.26**	1.00				
5. Soft tactics	.67**	.68**	.40**	.73**	1.00			
6. Personal appeals	.38**	.24*	.11	.40**	.31**	1.00		
7. Rational persuasion	.48**	.45**	.36**	.46**	.71**	-.00	1.00	
8. Negotiation	.47**	.49**	.13	.57**	.53**	.46**	.17	1.00

$*p < .05. **p < .01.$

Outcomes, Justice, and Frequency
of Influence Tactics

To test hypotheses I-A, I-B, and II-A-D, Pearson correlation coefficients between, on the one hand, procedural justice aspects and quality of outcomes of the merger, and on the other hand, backstage and frontstage influence tactics, were computed. Results are presented in Table 4.

As can be seen in Table 4, hypothesis I-A is supported for two of three backstage tactics: Both politicking and socializing/networking covary with the merger outcomes that are received and/or expected by the people participating in the study. So, the more negative their own outcomes are, the more frequently people try to influence other persons by politicking or by networking, and by the socializing influence behaviors. However, manipulation tactics did not covary significantly with the quality of outcomes attributed to the merger.

Hypothesis I-B has to be rejected: negativity of own outcomes of the merger doesn't covary significantly with the frequency of using hard influence tactics. It is remarkable, though, that negative outcomes do seem to covary with the use of rational persuasion. Apparently, this frontstage tactic seems to be perceived as suitable for trying to influence the quality of outcomes that one (should) receive.

According to hypothesis II-A, more voice should lead to a lower frequency of backstage influence tactics. Reality presents us with a different picture, however. Voice doesn't covary with the frequencies of manipulation and socializing/ networking, and there even is a positive correlation between voice and the frequency of politicking backstage behaviors. So, hypothesis II-A has to be rejected. Hypothesis II-B does better than hypothesis II-A, and receives mixed support. As predicted, voice covaries positively with the use of soft influence tactics. However, the expected negative correlation with the use of hard tactics was not obtained. And, again, rational persuasion covaries with voice given to people. Apparently, this frontstage, open tactic is seen as an acceptable means of influencing other persons—in particular, when the organization offers formal opportunities to influence the process of a merger.

In hypothesis II-C it was stated that giving people adequate notice and information about the merger lowers the frequency with which these persons use backstage influence tactics. The hypothesis has to be rejected: Neither politicking nor manipulation covary significantly with adequate notice, while socializing/networking even shows a significant positive instead of a negative correlation with this procedural justice aspect. There is mixed support for hypothesis II-D. As predicted, the frequency with which soft influence tactics are used covaries positively with giving people adequate notice. Adequate notice was also expected to covary negatively with the use of hard influence tactics, but this part of the hypothesis is not supported by the data.

Table 4. Correlations between Procedural Justice / Own Outcomes of Mergers, and Frequency of Influence Tactics

	Influence tactics							
	Backstage tactics					Frontstage tactics		
Procedural justice	I Politicking	II Manipulating	III Socializing	Hard tactics	Soft tactics	Personal appeals	Rational persuasion	Negoti- ations
Voice	.28*	.05	.06	.24	.27*	–.00	.24*	.13
Information (adequate notice)	.21	.09	.38**	.12	.25*	–.03	.23	.04
Outcomes of merger for person (low scores = positive outcomes)	.24*	.18	.27*	.20	.20	.11	.24*	.07

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Bases of Power and Influence Tactics

Hypotheses III-XIII were tested by computing the Pearson correlation coefficients between the strengths of all bases of power and the frequency with which backstage and frontstage influence tactics are used. Table 5 summarizes all results.

Most hypotheses were supported by the data. As was predicted in hypothesis III, expert power covaries positively with the use of soft influence tactics. Expert power also covaries positively with rational persuasion, as was predicted by hypothesis XIII. However, the pattern of correlations between expert power and the three backstage influence tactics is not completely in accordance with the pattern that was predicted by hypothesis XI. For, although strength of expert power indeed does not covary with politicking and socializing/networking, there is a nonpredicted positive correlation between expert power and manipulation tactics. So, hypothesis XI receives mixed support by the data of the present research.

As was clarified in the section on data structure, the scale measuring the strength of referent power had to be split up. The classic form of referent power, measured by the two-item instrument, did not covary positively with soft frontstage influence tactics. This means, of course, that hypothesis IV has to be rejected. Hypothesis XII does a better job, however: As was predicted beforehand, referent power does not covary with the use of backstage influence tactics. How about the integrity aspect as a basis of power? The pattern of correlations is more or less the same as the pattern of correlations demonstrated by the classic referent power, but there is one exception, namely a significant correlation with rational persuasion (which was not predicted).

Legitimate power behaves as was predicted by hypothesis V: a positive correlation with the use of hard influence tactics. However, legitimate power also covaries positively with soft tactics and with rational persuasion. Apparently, those who have legitimate power are aware of the fact that hard tactics may have undesirable side effects. Therefore, they also make use of other tactics, which are, in general, preferred by the targets of influence behaviors. Suppose that these other, softer tactics don't give the results desired by actors with a legitimate power basis. In such situations, these actors always can resort to the hard tactics legitimately available to them.

According to hypothesis VIII, having legitimate power should also covary positively with the use of backstage influence tactics. This hypothesis is supported for two backstage tactics—politicking and manipulation—but not for the third one (socializing/networking).

The two hypotheses focusing on coercive power strongly resemble the hypotheses focusing on legitimate power. The resemblances extend to the results of testing the hypotheses. Coercive power shows the predicted correlation with hard tactics (hypothesis VI), and also has a significant (but not expected) positive

Table 5. Correlations between Bases of Power and Influence Tactics

Bases of power	Backstage tactics			Frontstage tactics				
	I Politicking	II Manipulating	III Socializing	Hard tactics	Soft tactics	Personal appeals	Rational persuasion	Negoti- ations
Expert	.23	.39**	.14	.22	.41**	-.05	.47**	.14
Referent	.01	.06	.21	-.05	.06	-.02	.07	.04
Integrity	-.06	.10	.12	-.01	.11	-.03	.24*	-.03
Legitimate	.26*	.28*	.19	.44**	.44**	-.18	.45**	.09
Coercive	.27*	.18	.15	.24*	.24*	-.16	.19	.13
Reward	.39**	.22*	.19	.46**	.41*	-.03	.43**	.18
Information	-.02	.12	.25*	.12	.07	.07	.15	.20
(Social) networking	.45**	.37**	.20	.51**	.52**	.11	.41**	.20

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

correlation with the frequency of using soft tactics. Moreover, coercive power covaries, as was predicted by hypothesis IX, positively with the use of a backstage influence tactic: politicking. However, correlations between coercive power and the two other forms of backstage influence tactic did not reach statistical significance.

Reward power is the third form of position power that was studied. Predictions were that the strength of this basis of power would correlate positively with the use of hard influence tactics (hypothesis VII) and the frequency of backstage tactics (hypothesis X). Both hypotheses were largely supported by the data: Reward power covaries with the use of hard influence tactics and also with two of the three backstage tactics (politicking and manipulation). Again, some unexpected results were found. Strength of reward power correlates positively with soft influence tactics and with rational persuasion. It can be seen from these results that all three forms of position power have more or less the same effects. Having position power enhances the probability of using hard influence tactics. It also stimulates people to use some form of backstage influence tactics. However, people having position power also frequently tend to use soft influence tactics and often—for those having legitimate and/or reward power—resort to rational persuasion, too. Rational persuasion does not covary with coercive power. It is, perhaps, difficult to convince people with logical reasoning while punishing them; this *combination* simply seems to be inappropriate for influencing target persons.

Finally, we explored the covariations between the aspects of informational power and the several backstage and frontstage influence tactics. Having information in itself doesn't seem to have strong effects on the preference for influence tactics, with one exception: socializing/networking. However, the second item, measuring the availability of important social contacts, demonstrates exactly the same pattern of correlations that was shown by two forms of position power: legitimate and reward power. The explanation for this remarkable fact is rather straightforward. Having useful social contacts simply seems to be another form of position power, even though it is possible that the personal characteristics of the actors play a role in building a network of social contacts.

Other Frontstage Tactics

Until now, the focus has been on backstage tactics, hard and soft frontstage tactics, and rational persuasion. This was with good reason, of course: All the hypotheses predicted covariations between, on the one hand, outcomes and/or procedural justice and/or basis of power, and, on the other hand, one or more of these influence tactics. From Table 1 it can be seen that rational persuasion is the influence tactic used most frequently by the persons participating in our study. Perhaps this has something to do with the culture of the organization. Most employees are professionals, often with academic or college degrees. Rationality seems to be almost naturally part of the culture in such professional organizations.

As for the other two influence tactics, personal appeals and negotiation, they were the two least frequently used tactics. It is interesting to see that neither the frequency of personal appeals nor the frequency of negotiation tactics covaries significantly with voice, information, outcomes, or bases of power. One cannot conclude, however, that these tactics always are unimportant. More research is needed in a variety of organizations with a variety of characteristics.

CONCLUSION

The present research demonstrates convincingly that backstage influence tactics are used rather frequently by actors. Therefore, the relative lack of attention to these tactics cannot be defended by the facts. Future research should pay more attention to backstage tactics. Future research should also focus on individual differences between actors, in particular to the tendency to use many tactics.

There was mixed support for our hypotheses by the data of the present study. It may be concluded that, at last in situations of mergers where the stakes are high, perceptions of negative outcomes lead to higher probabilities that backstage influence tactics will be used. As predicted, more procedural justice seems to lead to a higher frequency of soft influence tactics. However, procedural justice aspects such as voice and adequate information don't exclude the possibility that backstage tactics are used by actors.

It is wise to adhere to procedural justice norms during mergers. These norms covary positively with soft influence tactics, and it is generally accepted that soft tactics are more appreciated by targets than are the harder tactics [32].

Available bases of power may affect actors' choices of influence tactics. This finding supports the theoretical notions that were advanced earlier by some researchers [see, e.g., 5, 56]. Having position power enhances the probability that hard tactics are used; however, it also seems to strengthen the inclination to use soft tactics and rational persuasion. Position power also enhances the probability of using one or more of the backstage tactics. Those lucky managers who have referent power don't need to use influence tactics at all. They are seen as an example, a role model. Rational persuasion, a tactic that is neither hard nor soft, is used rather frequently both by experts and by people having high position power (with the exception of the punishment power basis).

*   *   *

Dr. Herman Steensma is an associate professor of organizational psychology at Leiden University, the Netherlands. Research interests include leadership, social justice, organizational change, quality of working life, violence in the workplace, and complex decision-making processes.

Femke van Milligen, M.A., studied social and organizational psychology at Leiden University and received an M.A. in 1999. Since then she has been manager of Nanni Studio, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

REFERENCES

1. D. Kipnis, S. M. Schmidt, and I. Wilkinson, Intraorganizational Influence Tactics: Explorations in Getting One's Way, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 65,* pp. 440-452, 1980.

2. D. Kipnis and S. M. Schmidt, Upward Influence Styles, *Administrative Science Quarterly, 33,* pp. 528-542, 1988.

3. C. A. Schriesheim and T. R. Hinkin, Influence Tactics Used by Subordinates: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis and Refinement of the Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson Subscales, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 75,* pp. 246-257, 1990.

4. G. Yukl and C. M. Falbe, Influence Tactics and Objectives in Upward, Downward, and Lateral Influence Attempts, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 75,* pp. 132-140, 1990.

5. G. Yukl and J. B. Tracey, Consequences of Influence Tactics Used with Subordinates, Peers, and the Boss, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 77,* pp. 525-535, 1992.

6. K. Bennebroek Gravenhorst and J. Boonstra, Beïnvloedingsgedrag van Adviseurs in Veranderingsprocessen, *M&O Tijdschrift voor Management en Organisatie, 51*:2, pp. 36-49, 1997.

7. G. Bickle, Assessing Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the Influence Behavior Questionnaire, *Psychological Reports, 82,* pp. 923-929, 1998.

8. G. Bickle, Influence Tactics by Subordinates: An Empirical Analysis of the Kipnis and Schmidt Subscales, *Psychological Reports, 86,* pp. 143-154, 2000.

9. H. Hoving, *Leiden met PIT—Inspireren en Innoveren in Organisaties,* Utrecht: Lemma, 2000.

10. B. G. Rule, G. L. Bisanz, and M. Kohn, Anatomy of Persuasion Schema: Targets, Goals and Strategies, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48,* pp. 1127-1140, 1985.

11. B. Guerin, Some Influence in One-to-One and Group Situations: Predicting Influence Tactics from Basic Group Processes, *The Journal of Social Psychology, 135,* pp. 371-385, 1995.

12. J. Bruins, *Predicting the Use of Influence Tactics: A Classification and the Role of Group Membership,* paper presented at the 8th European Congress on Work and Organizational Psychology, April 2-5, 1997, Verona, Italy.

13. R. J. Deluga, The Relationship of Subordinate Upward-Influencing Behavior, Health Care Manager Interpersonal Stress, and Performance, *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21*:1, pp. 78-88, 1991.

14. R. J. Deluga and J. T. Perry, The Relationship of Subordinate Upward-Influencing Behavior, Satisfaction, and Perceived Superior Effectiveness with Leader-Member Exchanges, *Journal of Occupational Psychology, 64,* pp. 239-252, 1991.

15. S. M. Farmer, J. M. Maslyn, D. B. Fedor, and J. S. Goodman, Putting Upward Influence Strategies in Context, *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18,* pp. 12-42, 1997.

16. W. C. Grams and R. W. Rogers, Power and Personality: Effects of Machiavellianism, Need for Approval, and Motivation on Use of Influence Tactics, *The Journal of General Psychology, 117*:1, pp. 71-82, 1990.

17. R. P. Vecchio and M. Sussmann, Choice of Influence Tactics: Individual and Organizational Determinants, *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 12,* pp. 73-80, 1991.

18. B. H. Raven, A Power Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: French and Raven Thirty Years Later, *Journal of Behavior and Personality, 7,* pp. 217-244, 1992.

19. A. J. Stahelski and C. F. Paynton, The Effect of Status on Choices of Social Power and Influence Strategies, *The Journal of Social Psychology, 135,* pp. 553-560, 1995.

20. R. J. Deluga and J. Souza, The Effect of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Styles on the Influencing Behavior of Subordinate Police Officers, *Journal of Occupational Psychology, 64,* pp. 49-55, 1991.

21. G. Bickle, Do Work Values Predict the Use of Intraorganizational Influence Strategies? *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30*:1, pp. 196-205, 2000.

22. H. Steensma, S. Jansen, and C. Vonk, Organizational Culture and the Use of Influence Tactics by Managers, *Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, 30*:1, pp. 47-57, 2002.

23. G. Yukl, H. Kim, and C. Chavez, *Power, Influence Tactics and Issue Content as Determinants of Influence Success,* paper presented at the 8th European Congress of Work and Organizational Psychology, April 2-5, 1997, Verona, Italy.

24. G. Yukl, P. J. Guinan, and D. Sottolano, Influence Tactics Used for Different Objectives with Subordinates, Peers, and Superiors, *Group & Organization Management, 20,* pp. 272-296, 1995.

25. B. Van Knippenberg and H. Steensma, Future Interaction Expectation and the Use of Soft and Hard Influence Tactics, *Applied Psychology: An International Review, 52*:2 (in press), 2003.

26. G. Yukl, C. M. Falbe, and J. Y. Youn, Patterns of Influence Behavior for Managers, *Group & Organization Management, 18,* pp. 5-28, 1993.

27. H. Steensma, *Why Managers Prefer Some Influence Tactics to Other Tactics: A Net Utility Explanation,* manuscript submitted for publication, 2001.

28. D. Boddy and D. Buchanan, *Take the Lead: Interpersonal Skills for Project Managers,* Prentice Hall, New York, 1992.

29. D. Buchanan and D. Boddy, *The Expertise of the Change Agent,* Prentice Hall, New York, 1992.

30. R. A. Friedman, *Frontstage, Backstage: The Dramatic Structure of Labor Negotiations,* The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.

31. B. J. M. Emans and A. M. A. Bouwmeester, Backstage Beïnvloedingsgedrag van Organisatie-Adviseurs, *Gedrag en Organisatie, 6,* pp. 345-356, 1997.

32. B. van Knippenberg, *Determinants of the Use of Hard and Soft Influence Tactics,* dissertation, Leiden, 1999.

33. B. J. Tepper, S. J. Brown, and M. D. Hunt, Strength of Subordinates Upward Influence Tactics and Gender Congruency Effects, *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23,* pp. 1903-1919, 1993.

34. P. C. Haspeslagh and D. B. Jemison, *Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value through Corporate Renewal,* Free Press, New York, 1991.

35. J. Birkinshaw, H. Bresman, and L. Håkanson, Managing the Post-Acquisition Integration Process: How the Human Integration and Task Integration Processes Interact to Foster Value Creation, *Journal of Management Studies, 37*:3, pp. 395-425, 2000.

36. W. Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making, *Psychological Bulletin, 51,* pp. 380-417, 1954.

37. N. T. Feather, Subjective Probability and Decision Under Uncertainty, *Psychological Review, 66,* pp. 150-164, 1959.

38. V. H. Vroom, *Work and Motivation,* Wiley, New York, 1964.

39. M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research,* Addison Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1975.

40. J. Thibaut and L. Walker, *Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis,* Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1975.

41. R. Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of "Voice" and Improvement of Experienced Inequity, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,* pp. 108-119, 1977.

42. G. S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in *Social Exchange: Advances in theory and Research,* K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, and R. H. Willis (eds.), Plenum Press, New York, pp. 27-54, 1980.

43. B. H. Sheppard, R. J. Lewicki, and J. W. Minton, *Organizational Justice: The Search for Fairness in the Workplace,* Lexington Books, New York, 1992.

44. T. R. Tyler and E. A. Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 25), M. P. Zanna (ed.), Academic Press, San Diego, California, pp. 115-191, 1992.

45. K. Van den Bos, *Procedural Justice and Conflict,* dissertation, Leiden, 1996.

46. A. Fokker and H. Steensma, De Procesrechtvaardigheid van Organisatieveranderingen, in *Trends in Organisatieverandering,* H. Steensma (ed.), Lemma, Utrecht, pp. 123-145, 1999.

47. J. Greenberg, Determinants of Perceived Fairness of Performance Evaluation, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 71,* pp. 340-342, 1986.

48. R. Kanfer, J. Sawyer, P. C. Early, and E. A. Lind, Fairness and Participation in Evaluation Procedures: Effects on Task Attitudes and Performance, *Social Justice Research, 1*:2, pp. 235-249, 1987.

49. R. Folger, M. Konovski, and R. Cropanzano, A Due Process Metaphor for Performance Appraisal, in *Research in Organizational Behavior, 13,* B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings (eds.), JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, pp. 129-177, 1992.

50. R. Cropanzano and M. L. Randall, Advance Notice as a Means of Reducing Relative Deprivation, *Social Justice Research, 8*:2, pp. 217-238, 1995.

51. M. S. Taylor, K. B. Tracey, M. K. Renard, J. K. Harrison, and S. J. Carroll, Due Process in Performance Appraisal: A Quasi-Experiment in Procedural Justice, *Administrative Science Quarterly, 40,* pp. 495-523, 1995.

52. H. Steensma and L. Otto, Perception of Performance Appraisal by Employees and Supervisors: Self-Serving Bias and Procedural Justice, *Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, 29*:4, pp. 307-319, 2000.

53. J. R. P. French and B. H. Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in *Studies in Social Power,* D. Cartwright (ed.), Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, pp. 150-167, 1959.

54. B. H. Raven, Social Influence and Power, in *Current Studies in Social Psychology,* I. D. Steiner and M. Fishbein (eds.), Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, pp. 371-382, 1965.

55. B. Bass, *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership,* Free Press, New York, 1990.

56. L. Atwater and F. J. Yammarino, Bases of Power in Relation to Leader Behavior: A Field Investigation, *Journal of Business and Psychology, 11*:1, pp. 3-22, 1996.
57. G. Yukl and C. M. Falbe, The Importance of Different Power Sources in Downward and Lateral Relations, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 76,* pp. 416-423, 1991.
58. C. L. Sheridan, *Fundamentals of Experimental Psychology,* Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1971.

Direct reprint requests to:

Dr. Herman Steensma
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology
Leiden University
P.O. Box 9555
2300 RB Leiden
The Netherlands