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THE STUDY OF BOMBINGS, INCENDIARIES, AND BOMB THREATS IN THE CITY OF DALLAS FOR THE YEAR 1975

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ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the spatial as well as non-spatial analysis of bomb threats and explosions in the city of Dallas for the year 1975. Information in the form of bomb logs was provided by the Explosive Ordinance Unit, Tactical Services, Section, Special Operations Division of the Dallas Police Department.

The preliminary perusal of bomb log data for the year 1975 calendar year revealed that 396 incidents concerning bomb threats and bombings were reported to the Dallas Police Department; however, only thirty-five incidents or 8.8 per cent of the reported 396 incidents actually resulted in a bombing. Some of our most basic findings were the following: bombings which resulted in casualties or major property damage were rare; revenge was the most common motive; public buildings, business offices, and residential structures were the primary locations for incidents; the ethnic/racial characteristics of 43.6 per cent of the suspects could not be determined; females tended to be underrepresented in the suspect category; bombings, incendiaries, and bomb threats were the actions of youthful offenders.

Preliminary Findings: A General Overview

This study is concerned with the spatial as well as non-spatial analysis of bomb threats and explosions in the city of Dallas for the year 1975.[1] Information in the form of bomb logs was provided by the Explosive Ordinance Unit, Tactical Services Section, Special Operations Division of the Dallas Police

[1] Bomb threats, bombings (explosives) and fire bombs (as well as combustible materials) are listed under Section 28.02 of the Penal Code of the State of Texas.

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Department. It is hoped that data and trends noted in this study will further the understanding of the motives and substance of the attacks and threats perpetrated by "revengeful persons and (so-called) revolutionary groups."

The preliminary perusal of Bomb Log Data for the 1975 calendar year revealed that 396 incidents concerning bombs and explosives were reported to the Dallas Police Department.[2] Members of the Explosive Ordinance Unit responded to 149 of these requests for assistance. The following is a breakdown of the incidents involving bombs and explosives which were recorded by the Explosive Ordinance Unit.

Incidents

THIRTY-FIVE BOMBING INCIDENTS OCCURRED

Only thirty-five incidents or 8.8 per cent of the reported 396 incidents actually resulted in a bombing. Four of these incidents are listed as bombing attempts since the devices malfunctioned and no property damage or injury resulted. There were sixteen actual bombings which resulted in approximately $3100 property damage and two injuries. No deaths resulted from any of the bombing incidents. Fifteen arrests were made as a result of these incidents and nine prosecution reports were filed with the District Attorney. It is important to note that the Explosive Ordinance Division estimates that only 20 per cent of all bomb threats made against Dallas citizens are ever reported to the Dallas Police Department. I believe that one can conclude that the making of bomb threats is a relatively safe act; i.e., it usually does not result in arrest or prosecution. However, once a threat is perpetrated, the likelihood of arrest and prosecution is quite real, since fifteen of thirty-seven suspects were arrested (and 60 per cent of those arrests resulted in prosecutorial action by the police). It should also be noted that the actual damage to property is relatively minor; this is especially interesting when one realizes the often pervasive state of fear which grips a city when the threat of bombings is imminent.

361 BOMB THREATS WERE REPORTED TO THE EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE UNIT

The telephone is the most common instrument for making threats; i.e., 348 of these threats were made by telephone, seven by written communication, and six made by verbal face-to-face communication. Although none of these threats led to the recovery of an actual explosive device, three hoax bombs

[2] Official police Bomb Logs list 516 incidents. However, 120 of these incidents include routine training sessions, demonstrations, and lectures.

were recovered. (The devices were used in connection with the criminal attempts of robbery and extortion.) In connection with the bomb threats, seven arrests were made which resulted in prosecution reports being filed with the District Attorney in four cases. Again, it must be concluded that one can make bomb threats with relative impunity.

EIGHTY-THREE CALLS WERE ANSWERED BY BOMB TECHNICIANS WHICH RESULTED IN THE RECOVERY OF A LARGE VARIETY OF EXPLOSIVE ITEMS[3]

Included in these recoveries are the following:

1. twenty-one homemade bombs
2. thirty-five items of military ordinance
3. 435 pounds of commercial explosives
4. 1281 blasting caps
5. forty-four miscellaneous items of commercial explosives
6. in excess of 3000 rounds of small arms ammunition
7. three hoax bomb devices.

The single most important factor to note in regard to the recovery of explosive items is the lack of knock-down or killing power as well as technical sophistication displayed by the explosive devices. This of course leads one to conclude that the devices were made more for "threat" effect than for destructive or explosive effect. In addition, it should be noted that seventeen items suspected of being bombs were dispositioned as non-hazardous, following "render safe" procedures by bomb technicians. Six arrests were made in connection with the recoveries and prosecution reports were filed with the District Attorney in three cases. It should also be noted that six security assignments were worked by bomb technicians which involved the protection of V. I. P. government officials.

The activity which resulted from incidents involving bombs and explosives in 1975 remained relatively constant with the reported incidents in 1974. Those reported in 1975 totaled 516 and in 1974 the total was 519.[4] The most significant change in activity was in the area of bomb threats. Three-hundred-twenty were reported in 1974 and 361 in 1975, an 11.4 per cent increase.

[3] Data cited in this section was taken from the Annual Report, provided by the Bomb Squad, City of Dallas Police Department. That report cites the figure given.

[4] One should recall that only 396 of the reported 516 incidents noted in the Dallas Police Department's Bomb Log were "actual" incidents; review footnote No. 2 for a more complete explanation of the difference noted here.

Detailed Analysis

CROSS-TABULATIONS

This section is concerned with the detailed analysis of two-way and three-way cross-tabulations of bomb data involving threats, incendiaries and explosions. Two-way cross-tabulations are utilized in the investigation of the relationship between the object of attack and the following variables: location as denoted by the Federal Census Tract, the day of week, the month of year, the time of day or night, the type of location or facility bombed or threatened, the method employed by the "bomber" or threatener, the motive behind the bombing or the threat, the race of the suspect or suspects, the number of suspects involved in the incident, and the police beat and report area in which the incident took place.[5] Three-way cross-tabulations were employed in order to study the relation of the object of the attack and the type of location or facility bombed or threatened to the following variables: motive-method, motive-race (of suspect(s)), method-race (of suspect(s)), time of day-method, motive-time of day, motive-sex (of suspect(s)), method-sex (of suspect(s)), age (of suspect(s))–sex (of suspect(s)), age (of suspect(s))–method, and age (of suspect(s))–motive.

Object of Attack

BY MOTIVE

What were the most likely targets for bombings and bomb threats and what were the most common motives for "attacks" and threats by our subjects? For these 396 incidents, there were 120 categories listed as objects of attack,[6] and seven basic motives which activated the suspects.[7] The seven motives were listed as "revenge," "profit," "concealed crime," "riot/insurrection," "subversion/sabotage," "other," and "unknown." (A later section will collapse the listing of 120 categories into seven types of structures.) The most frequent object of attack was grouped under the category "bar,"

[5] Due to space limits, we have opted to exclude the presentation of macro-locational factors such as the relationship between the object of attack and the following variables: Federal Census Tract, police beat and report area in which the incident occurred. Parties interested in this data may request copies of my follow-up study of these as well as other spatial variables. This study is currently under review and should be available shortly.

[6] A complete listing of all "objects of attack" are available upon request.

[7] The motive category utilized by the authors was provided by the Dallas Police Department. Other motives are both possible and probable. However, our data was pre-recoded by the police into the motive categories noted here.

see Table 1. This group includes our classic "hole-in-the-wall" stand-up bar, as well as the more elegant lounge and night-club type facility. Thirty-four incidents involved "bars"; i.e., 8.6 per cent of all of the incidents. Police sources stated that "extortion" was seldom the motive behind incidents which involved bars. Our data reveals that the police were unable to clearly designate the motive behind thirty of the thirty-four incidents; i.e., 88.2 per cent of the incidents. However, when the motive was known (in four cases) the motive was invariably "revenge." Police sources stated that motives behind "revenge" often included "straights" seeking retribution for having had their sensitivities violated at a "gay" bar. The straight supposedly entered the "gay" bar without knowing that it was "gay" and was offended by what he saw, heard, and/or experienced and apparently decided that it would be great "sport" to phone in a bomb threat after leaving the facility. Another basic motive for "revenge" was the "playing out" of one's frustration and anger for having been invited to leave said facility; i.e., in the words of Flip Wilson, the "bouncee" decided to reap his revenge on the "bouncer" (and thus the facility which employed him).

Table 1. Object of Attack

Object of Attack	*Ranked by Frequency of Incidents*	*Number of Incidents*	*Percent of Total*
Bar	1	34	8.6
Miscellaneous	2 (actually tied for first)	34	8.6
Single Family Dwelling	3	31	7.8
Supermarket	4	26	6.6
Miscellaneous Office	5	25	6.3
Hospital	6	24	6.1
Restaurant	7	20	5.1
Department Store	8	17	4.3
Federal Government	9	15	3.8
School	10	13	3.0

The category labeled "miscellaneous" actually tied the previously named category for first place in regard to bomb threats and bombings. However, this category ("miscellaneous") is too diverse for any type of sound analysis of object and/or motive since it includes all those categories not included in our 119 other headings. We can again, however, state that the motives behind

these attacks remain obscure, since motive is known for only five of the thirty-four incidents. When the motive was known, the motive was, again "revenge" (three cases). However, we did catalogue one incident motivated by "profit" and another whose motive was included in our "catch-all" category, entitled "other."

"Single-family dwellings" was the third most frequent object of attack. Thirty-one incidents or 7.8 per cent of the incidents were included in this category. The Bombing Log reveals that in twenty-three of the thirty-one cases, or 74.2 per cent, the motive behind the attacks or threats were "unknown." However, when the motive was known, the motive was usually that of "revenge"; i.e., seven cases or 22.6 per cent of the incidents were motivated by revenge while one incident involved "subversion and/or sabotage."

The fourth most frequent object was the "supermarket"; i.e., twenty-six incidents or 6.6 per cent of all incidents involved "supermarkets." Police data does not give us a handle on the motive behind these incidents. The six incidents in which the motive was ascertained were included in the "catch-all" category "other" rather than "revenge," "profit," "concealed crime," "riot and insurrection," "subversion and sabotage," or "unknown." Thus, at this time it is impossible for me to speculate further as to incentive or motive behind these attacks.

The "miscellaneous office" category comprised the fifth most frequent target of attack. This category experienced twenty-five incidents or 6.3 per cent of the incidents. Again, the motive behind these attacks was obscure with only one motive disclosed; i.e., one incident involved "revenge."

The sixth most frequent target of attack was categorized as "hospitals," accounting for 6.1 per cent of all incidents. When the motive behind the incident was known (in five of the twenty-four incidents) the most frequent motive was "revenge." That is, three of the incidents or 9.4 per cent were motivated by "revenge," while the categories "profit" and "other" were the apparent motives for one incident.

The category "restaurant" ranked seventh, and included twenty incidents or 5.1 per cent of all incidents. The motive was known for two of these incidents; i.e., one incident involved "revenge" while one incident involved "subversion and/or sabotage" (a rather uncommon motive, when the motive is known).

"Department stores" ranked eighth as the most "popular" target of attack, and were involved in seventeen incidents or 4.3 per cent of all the incidents. When the motive was known (in two cases, or 11.8 per cent of the incidents) the motive was "profit." This is quite interesting since disgruntled check cashers are well known for their angry verbiage.

Property owned by the "federal government" was involved in fifteen incidents or 3.8 per cent of all incidents. This finding placed the category

ninth in frequency of attack. The motive was known in only one case, but it is interesting to note that in this instance the motive was "revenge," not riot/insurrection" or "subversion/sabotage."

The tenth most frequent objects of attack were "schools" with thirteen incidents. The known motives behind the attacks were listed as "revenge" (one incident) and "other." Police records did not indicate whether the person involved was a student, teacher, administrator, parent, or a citizen not employed by the school.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Table 3 reveals that the most frequent objects of attack listed in our top ten categories involved only two government related institutions, "Federal Government" and "schools" (which included private parochial and non-parochial schools as well as the Dallas Independent School District). Of equal interest is the fact that such apolitical targets as "bars," "single-family dwellings," and "restaurants" comprised 21.5 per cent of ALL the incidents. Traditional members of American industrial-commercial capitalism were also well represented in the top ten categories; i.e., "supermarkets," "miscellaneous offices" and "department stores" ranked fourth, fifth, and eighth, respectively, "Hospitals" in Dallas, Texas, which were the sixth most frequent object of attack, are usually either church or university related. Consequently, they are private rather than public institutions. Other sections of this paper will further investigate the link between these objects of threats and attacks and various other variables.

The fact that the motive behind the various 396 incidents was seldom known reflects the fact that very few bombers and bomb threateners are ever captured and questioned. The police were unaware of the motive behind 85.9 per cent of the 396 incidents. One should also note that most bomb threat incidents were made by telephone; i.e., 348 of the 396 incidents (or 87.9 per cent) were made by telephone. The threateners and bombers did not often verbalize their motivation during these curt monologues. Nonetheless, when the motive was known for these threats and acts, the most frequent motive was "revenge" (8.1 per cent), see Tables 2 and 3. This is an extremely important finding, since the popular image of the bomber or bomb threatener is that of a bomb throwing, fire breathing revolutionary or terrorist, when in reality he or she is very likely to be seeking vengeance. The Dallas, Texas case, of course, could be unique; perhaps the political factor is not present in the social psyche of people in Dallas or in the Southwest.[8] Nonetheless, the reality is that although revolutionaries and terrorists may hide

[8] One of the authors of this study; i.e., Dr. Georges, is currently involved with the analysis of F. B. I. National bomb data. It is hoped that the more comprehensive scope of this data will enable one to better interpret the findings of this case study.

Table 2. Motive of Attack

Motive	*Number of Incidents*	*Percent of Total*
Revenge	32	8.1
Profit	7	1.8
Concealed Crime	0	0.0
Riot/Insurrection	0	0.0
Subversion/Sabotage	3	0.8
Other	14	3.5
Unknown	340	85.9

Table 3. Most Common Target of Attack or Threat

Object	*Number of Incident*	*Percent of Total*	*Most Common Known Motive*
Bar	34	8.6	Revenge
Miscellaneous	34	8.6	Revenge
Single-Family	31	7.8	Revenge
Supermarket	26	6.6	Other
Miscellaneous Office	25	6.3	Revenge
Hospitals	24	6.1	Revenge
Restaurant	20	5.1	Revenge Subversion/ sabotage)
Department Store	17	4.3	Profit
Federal Government	15	3.8	Revenge
Schools	13	3.0	Revenge/Other

their personal identities, they do NOT usually hide the motivation behind their actions. Thus one can conclude that "riot/insurrection" and "subversion/ sabotage" were not key motivational factors in the threats and bombings which transpired during the calendar year 1975 in Dallas, Texas.

BY METHOD

Police data revealed that 361 of the incidents (or 91.2 per cent of all the incidents) were bomb threats. However, when a bombing does occur, the most likely method employed is the fire bomb, often referred to as the Molotov Cocktail. Twenty-four incidents (or 6.1 per cent of the incidents) involved fire bombs, while nine incidents (or 2.3 per cent) involved explosives. The method could not be ascertained for two of the incidents, see Table 4.

Table 4. Method of Attack or Threat

Method	*Number of Incidents*	*Percent of Total*
Explosives	9	2.3
Fire Bombs	24	6.1
Combustible Materials	0	0.0
Other	0	0.0
Unknown	2	0.5
Bomb Threat	361	91.2

The fact that bomb threats and fire bombings are the two most common "weapons" strongly suggests that the bomb threatener's or bomber's primary objective is terror rather than physical destruction. Thus these are acts of cognitive violence as much as physical violence. (Fire bombs may result in extensive damage, but this is rare, since they are often easily discovered and extinguished.) The use of bomb threats and fire bombs rather than high intensity explosives might also imply that the perpetrators of these actions lack the technical sophistication to utilize high explosives (such as plastics) or that these explosives are unavailable to them, perhaps because they lack the money to purchase them or the contacts needed to make purchases.

Type of structure which the bombing or the bomb threat was made against – Table 5 reveals that "business structures" are the most frequent targets of attack when we subdivide the structure category into eight subcategories; i.e., 281 incidents (or 71.0 per cent) involved "business structures." One should not, however, read anti-capitalist motivation into these incidents, since, as was noted earlier, "revenge" is the most frequent motivation for incidents in which the motive is known. Incidents involving "public buildings" ranked second in frequency with a total of forty-seven incidents (or 11.9 per cent of all incidents), while "residential structures" ranked third with thirty-eight incidents (or 9.6 per cent of the incidents). The fact that "public structures" made up 11.9 per cent of all incidents might

Table 5. Type of Structure Which Experienced a Bombing or Bomb Threat

Type of Structure	*Ranked by Frequency of Incidents*	*Number of Incidents*	*Percent of Total*
Business Structures	1	281	71.0
Public Buildings	2	47	11.9
Residential Structures	3	38	9.6
Schools	4	11	2.8
Vehicles	5	10	2.5
Other Building	6	6	1.5
Not Given	7	3	0.8

again lead us to a fallacious conclusion (that anti-state activity, be it "sabotage or subversion" or perhaps "riot or insurrection," was greatly involved in the motivation) unless we remember that "revenge" was the most common motive behind bombings and bomb threats. Of greater interest is the fact that "residential structures" made up 9.6 per cent of these incidents. The general populace, I believe, is quite unaware of the frequency with which residential structures are made the objects of threats and/or attacks. These residential incidents are probably thought of as unusual when they are not attributed to racial/ethnic violence. Further research might attempt to note if the bombing of residential structures involved interracial factors, as well as whether or not they occurred in ghetto fringe and transition zones.[9] Students of racial violence will be familiar with the use of terrorist bombings in Chicago in 1919 and East St. Louis in 1917. Table 5 also reveals that "schools," "vehicles," and "other buildings" constituted 2.8, 2.5, and 1.5 per cent of the incidents, respectively, while 0.8 per cent of the incidents were not identified as to type of structure. One must take caution in interpreting the rather small number of incidents which involved "schools." Although only eleven incidents (or 2.8 per cent of the incidents) fell in this category, one should note that it is more "closed" than most "structural" categories; i.e., in theory there could be a thousand and one types of business structures, residential structures and public buildings, but schools are limited to public and private pre-school, elementary, intermediate, high school, and university (college) level facilities. Nonetheless, as a "structural" type, "schools" rank as a rather small target category. (The same cautions are advised for the interpretation of the incidents which involve "vehicles.")

[9] Dr. Georges has recently completed a bomb study which examines this relationship. This paper is currently under review and should be available shortly.

RACE/ETHNIC IDENTITY

Are bombings and bomb threats perpetrated by solitary individuals or are they usually the actions of persons acting in concert? What is the racial/ethnic identity of persons who bomb or threaten to bomb? These questions are answered in this section. It is very difficult to determine the racial/ethnic identity of the suspects since the vast majority of the threats were made over the telephone and threats made up 91.2 per cent of our incidents. Although Texas blacks, whites, and latins have distinctive accents and/or dialects, a person who threatens to bomb a structure might readily attempt to disguise his or her voice. This factor, the factor of possible deception, is one which should be taken into account when an analysis of the racial/ethnic identity of our suspects is made. One should also realize that American Indians included in the ethnic/racial category "white" might account for the absence of Indian suspects, while the absence of suspects in the category "other" might be accounted for in the same manner; i.e., there are very few American born or first generation orientals in Dallas (and the vast majority of them are probably students). Arab students, East Indians, and other "social non-whites" probably merit inclusion in the university student category and are not highly "visible" to the general populace of Dallas, Texas. Many of them who are identifiable probably manifest "English" accents and would be included in the "white" category.

Table 6 reveals that the largest number of suspects were listed in the category "unidentified"; i.e., 178 suspects (or 43.6 per cent of our total) were unidentified as to race and/or ethnicity. Whites comprised 28.7 per cent of the total (the largest identifiable group of suspects), while the percentage of the total for blacks and latins was 23.0 and 4.7, respectively. Table 7 reveals that whites comprise 66.7 per cent of the Dallas City population while blacks and latins comprise 24.9 and 7.5 per cent of the Dallas City population, respectively. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the true relationship between the above mentioned variables when 43.6 per cent of the suspects were unidentified as to race and/or ethnicity. Nonetheless, if we assume that the racial/ethnic identity of the known suspects reflects the suspect population in general, we can come to certain conclusions. Blacks tend not to perform a disproportionate share of incidents. They comprise 24.9 per cent of the Dallas City population and commit 23.0 per cent of the bombing or bomb threat incidents, while latins and especially whites tend to commit less than their proportionate share of these incidents.[10] The following sections will note whether any of these ethnic/racial groups tend to commit crimes in concert more often than other ethnic/racial groups, and whether certain

[10] This leads me to conclude that one or more groups are either under or over represented in the race identifiable data.

Table 6. Race of Suspects

Race	*Number of Suspects*	*Percent of Total*
Unidentified	178	43.6
Black	94	23.0
White	117	28.7
Latin	19	4.7

Table 7. City of Dallas Race/Ethnicity

Race	*Number of Persons*	*Percent of Total*
Total Population	844,401	
White	563,001	66.7
Black	210,238	24.9
Spanish Language	63,246	7.5

ethnic/racial groups tend to perpetrate bombings and bomb threats against certain targets more often than do their counterparts in other ethnic/racial groups.

Police data reveals that bombings and bomb threats are not usually perpetrated by persons acting in concert: 392 of the 396 incidents were perpetrated by a solitary individual, three incidents were perpetrated by two persons acting in concert, and one incident involved three individuals. An analysis of incidents involving one perpetrator shows that 171 or 43.6 per cent of the incidents involved individuals whose racial/ethnic identity remained unidentified, 117 incidents or 29.8 per cent involved individuals identified as white, eighty-seven or 22.2 per cent of the incidents involved persons identified as black, and seventeen incidents or 4.3 per cent of the incidents involved persons identified as latin.

If one examines the data on incidents involving "unidentified" individuals the following can be noted:

1. the categories labeled "single family" and "bar" tied for first place in frequency of incidents, with each category recording seventeen incidents,
2. the category labeled "miscellaneous" was second in regard to incidence frequency with thirteen incidents,
3. both blacks and whites were frequently associated with the object category "miscellaneous."

Later sections will note that whites were more frequently associated with "bar" and "single family dwellings" than blacks.

The four categories with which whites tended to be most highly associated were "bars," "miscellaneous offices," "supermarkets" and our catch-all category, "miscellaneous." Thirteen of the thirty-four incidents (or 38.2 per cent) against "bars" involved whites, while only two incidents (or 5.9 per cent) involved blacks. The greater propensity for whites to be involved in "bar" incidents may reflect both their numerical dominance and the Texas "red neck" culture, which stresses "macho," alcohol, toughness, and social interaction. Further research will attempt to note the correlation between objects of attack (such as "bars") and the socio-economic makeup of the census tracts in which these targets (e.g., "bars") reside. The propensity for whites to be highly identified with incidents involving "miscellaneous offices" and "supermarkets" was probably accounted for by the fact that whites occupied a disproportionate share of the white collar positions in "offices" and "supermarkets" and thus had a disproportionate share of job related grievances. One should also note that a disproportionate percentage of "offices" and "supermarkets" were located in white neighborhoods possibly resulting in a disproportionate share of customer-management (i.e., buyer-seller) grievances involving whites.

Blacks were most often identified with the category "miscellaneous," which is too broad a category for speculation as to motive. Black suspects were involved in eleven incidents; i.e., 32.2 per cent of all the suspects for this incident category were black. "Hospitals" with seven incidents and "department stores" with six incidents ranked second and third, respectively, for frequency of incidents involving black suspects. Since revenge is often the motive behind incidents, one might speculate that Dallas blacks, who also tend to be quite poor, might have grievances against a hospital or department store and act out this grievance with a bombing and/or bomb threat. One must remember that a "fire bombing" or "bomb threat" is infinitely less expensive than a lawyer and the satisfaction is infinitely more immediate. Police sources noted that many bomb threats were the direct result of hostile encounters between would-be check cashers and store owners. Many blacks harbor anger and hurt because of wrongs or perceived wrongs, such as discourteous service suffered at the hands of whites during the check cashing ritual. It would be interesting to note the check cashing policies of the establishments which have been bombed or threatened by bombings as well as to note whether or not the hospitals which have been threatened are the objects of malpractice suits and other legal actions initiated by blacks. Discourteous service to blacks by white clerks and sales persons employed by "department stores" might result in a bombing or bomb threat. The fact that blacks often work as unskilled laborers or low paid sales personnel in the less exclusive "department stores" also creates the possibility of job related grievances.

The only categories which listed more than one incident involving latins were:

1. "hospitals" with five incidents or 20.8 per cent of the incidents involving "hospitals" being perpetrated by latins and 29.4 per cent of all incidents involving latins were against hospitals.
2. "department stores" with three incidents or 17.6 per cent of all incidents involving department stores being perpetrated by latins and 17.6 per cent of all incidents involving latins were against department stores.
3. "restaurants" with two incidents or 20 per cent of all incidents involving "restaurants" being perpetrated by latins and 11.8 per cent of all incidents involving latins were against restaurants.
4. "bars" with two incidents or 5.9 per cent of all incidents involving "bars" being perpetrated by latins and 11.8 per cent of all incidents involving latins were against "bars."

The incidents which involved "hospitals" might be the direct result of poverty and malpractice grievances as was noted above for blacks. Similarly, the explanation offered for blacks and "department store" related incidents can probably be offered again with the addition of insults or perceived insults related to language and other cultural factors (misunderstanding of language, dialect and/or manners on the part of all concerned). Incidents which involved "restaurants" could have resulted from discourteous service on the part of whites (a very real if not omnipresent remnant from the South's "separate but equal" era) and/or conflicts based on culture or language. It is also important to note that unskilled latins often work as "bus boys," dishwashers, and waiters in "restaurants." In fact, the Metroplex, according to Dallas and Ft. Worth city officials, has large numbers of illegal latins (Mexicans) who perform unskilled jobs in "restaurants" and "factories," thus creating the possibility of worker-employer conflicts. The speculation put forth for motives involving whites and "bar" related incidents probably applies to the latin group as well.

Three incidents involved two suspects. Four of the six suspects were black while the remaining two were latin. One incident with a black and a latin suspect involved a "building supply" company.[11] The second incident involved a "clothing store" and two black suspects while the third incident involved a "vending machine" company and one black and one latin suspect.

The single incident which involved three suspects (all of whom were black) was an incident involving a "single family" dwelling unit. This incident involved an actual bombing; i.e., the use of a Molotov cocktail. The apparent motive for this was "revenge."

[11] One should not assume that the cases with more than one suspect implies an incident in which the suspects acted in concert.

The Sex of the Suspect

BY MOTIVE

Are most bombers or bomb threateners men or are they women? Are men and women motivated by the same forces when they bomb or threaten to bomb? These are the questions addressed in this section.

Incidents involving one person – One hundred fifteen or 29.4 per cent of our suspects were not identified as to sex; forty-four or 11.3 per cent of our suspects were identified as female, while 232 or 59.3 per cent of our suspects were identified as male. Thus bombings and bomb threats appear to be more closely associated with males than with females. This reality might in part be due to the general societal condemnation of aggression or violent behavior manifested by females; i.e., women are, I believe, in general, still taught the values and merits of non-violence and passivity, while a bombing or threat of a bombing is a crime of "violence" against property or in rare cases, against the person. Another factor which might help account for the infrequent manifestation of women in this crime category is the fact that knowledge of explosives and combustibles probably fall outside of the general psychic realm of most women and thus the thought or act of threatening such an action or perpetrating such an act also falls outside of their "psychic realm"; i.e., outside of their immediate consciousness.

"Motive unknown" was the most frequent motive listed for all three sex categories, see Table 8; i.e., 88.7 per cent of the motives for incidents which involved "sexually" unidentified individuals were classified as "unknown," while 93.2 per cent and 83.2 per cent of the motives for females and males, respectively, were classified as "unknown." Nonetheless, if we examine those incidents in which the motive was determined, we note the following: "revenge" is the most frequent motivational factor for both men and women; i.e., twenty-one or 53.8 per cent of those cases in which the motive was known in an incident involving a male was listed as motivated by "revenge," while in two or 66.7 per cent of the cases in which the motive was known and the suspect was female, the motivation was "revenge." The same tendency also is true for the category of incidents in which the sex of the suspect was undetermined; i.e., eight or 61.5 per cent of the cases were apparently motivated by "revenge." "Profit" was not a major motivational force behind our incidents; i.e., only seven of 391 incidents were apparently motivated by this force. However, when it was the motivational force, one should note that it was very heavily skewed toward the male population; i.e., 85.7 per cent of all incidents which involved the motivational factor of "profit" involved men. (The reality was such that many, if not all, of these incidents which involved "sexually" undetermined individuals could have been perpetrated by males.)

Table 8. Sex by Motive

Count *Row %* *Column %* *Total %*	*Sex*			
	Not Given	*Male*	*Female*	*Row Total*
Revenge	8	21	2	31
	25.8	67.7	6.5	
	7.0	9.1	4.5	
	2.0	5.4	0.5	
Profit	1	6	0	7
	14.3	85.7	0.0	
	0.9	2.6	0.0	
	0.3	1.5	0.0	
Subversion/Sabotage	0	3	0	3
	0.0	100.0	0.0	
	0.0	1.3	0.0	
	0.0	0.8	0.0	
Other	4	9	1	14
	28.6	64.3	7.1	
	3.5	3.9	2.3	
	1.0	2.3	0.3	
Unknown	102	9	41	337
	30.4	64.3	12.2	
	88.7	3.9	93.2	
	26.1	2.3	10.5	
Column			44	
Total	115	232	11.3	392

One should also note that when "subversion/sabotage" is involved; i.e., three incidents, the sex of the suspects was invariably "male." This last finding might be reflective of the fact that radical politics is heavily dominated by males.

When more than one suspect is involved – The data revealed that there were four incidents which involved more than one suspect. In all four incidents the suspects were male. Three of the incidents had two suspects; the motive behind these incidents was listed as "undetermined." The one incident which involved three individuals was apparently motivated by "revenge."

BY OBJECT

When there is one suspect – Do men and women victimize different objects; i.e., are the targets of their threats and bombings significantly different? That was the question answered in this section.

As was mentioned previously, the sexual identity of 116 or 29.6 per cent of our total was classified as "undetermined." However, 232 or 59.2 per cent, of the subjects were classified as male.

The most frequent targets of bomb threats and/or bombings were noted in Table 1. Table 9 revealed that "bars" were the most frequent target for males. Twenty incidents (or 8.6 per cent of the incidents which involved males) involved attacks or threats upon a "bar" (or lounge). One should also note that 58.8 per cent of all incidents which involved an attack or threat on a "bar" (or lounge) were perpetrated by a male suspect, while only three incidents (or 8.8 per cent of all incidents which involved a "bar" or lounge) were perpetrated by a female. These sex skewed findings apparently reflect the (white) male oriented bar culture cited earlier, the "macho" male-oriented behavior and thought pattern which emphasizes bar and lounge activities (and their consequent conflicts). (See Table 10.)

The second most frequent object of threat or attack by males was the "supermarket." Males were involved in nineteen "supermarket" incidents (73.1 per cent of all the "supermarket" incidents), while women were involved in only 3.8 per cent of the "supermarket" incidents. That is, 8.2 per cent of the incidents which involved males involved "supermarkets," while only 2.3 per cent of all incidents in which females were involved involved "supermarkets." This is an interesting finding since women are the most frequent users of "supermarkets." This leads one to conclude that these incidents were not due to common customer-management grievances (unless, of course, the cultural taboo on female aggressiveness and violence mutes this form of expression in females). The most likely motivational factors were employee-management conflicts (involving a *male* employee in stock or receiving) or conflict due to check-cashing interaction.

Two categories tie for third in regard to frequency of occurrence of male perpetrated acts; i.e., "restaurants" and "miscellaneous." I will not attempt an explanation of possible motivations behind incidents involving the category, "miscellaneous", since it was all-inclusive. However, there were a number of plausible explanations for incidents which involved its rank-tie, "restaurants." This incident category is indeed an interesting one, since one can immediately observe that all sex identified incidents involved males; 7.3 per cent of all incidents involving males involved "restaurants" and 55 per cent of all "restaurant" incidents involved males. I would speculate that causative factors might be tied to the traditionally low paid, male-dominated "restaurant"

Table 9. Most Frequent Target of Attack for Males

Object of Incident	*Most Frequent Target of Male Number of Incidents*	*Most Frequent Target of Males, Percent of Total Incidents Involving Males*	*Target Females, Number of Incidents*	*Target Females, Percent of Total Incidents Involving Females*
Bar	20	8.6	3	6.8
Supermarket	19	8.2	1	2.3
Restaurants	17	7.3	0	2.3
Miscellaneous	17	7.3	6	13.6
Hospitals	16	6.9	4	9.1
Miscellaneous Office	15	6.5	6	24.0
Single Family Dwelling	13	5.6	1	2.3
Department Store	12	5.2	1	2.3
Schools	11	4.7	1	2.3
Federal Government	9	3.9	0	0.0
Drive-In-Market	7	3.0	0	0.0

Table 10. Method of Threat or Bombing by Sex

Method	*Number of Times Utilized by Male Suspect*	*Per cent of Male Suspects Who Utilized This Method*	*Number of Times Utilized by Female Suspect*	*Per cent of Female Suspects Who Utilized This Method*
Bomb Threat	220	94.8	43	97.7
Fire Bomb	10	4.3	1	2.3
Explosives	2	0.9	0	0.0

NOTE: Bomb threats were made in 95 incidents in which the sex of the suspect was undetermined.

service employees (bus-boys, dishwashers, and cooks) and their conflicts with the management. The other factor which merits mention is the reality that males appear to make up a disproportionate share of the "restaurant" trade, a fact which should be reflected in the sex composition of customer-management grievances.

The fourth most common target for male suspects was "hospitals." Sixteen incidents, or 6.9 per cent of all incidents perpetrated by males, were perpetrated against "hospitals" and 66.7 per cent of all incidents perpetrated against "hospitals" were perpetrated by males. In comparison, only four incidents were perpetrated against "hospitals" by females and only 16.7 per cent of all "hospital" incidents involved females. The preponderance of male incidents against "hospitals" is difficult to explain on the basis of client-management conflict when we consider that most "hospital" visits by the elderly or by a parent involves a famale adult. However, it is probably safe to assume that the male is the primary "bread earner" and that "hospital bills" are often viewed as excessive and callous by the male bill payer, thus resulting in the possibility of making a threat or performing a violent act. An even more likely explanation for the male dominance in this suspect category is the male dominated sex-ratio in the menial job categories so prevalent in "hospitals" (e.g., janitoral staff, ambulance workers, cooks and orderlies). Menial jobs often employ transient workers who are under-educated, under-paid and set apart by low ethnic/racial prestige and status. The resulting job related conflicts could easily result in violent actions or threats.

The fifth most common target is listed as "miscellaneous office." Males were involved in fifteen incidents, or 6.5 per cent of all incidents which involved males, while 60.0 per cent of all incidents which involved "miscellaneous offices" involved males. Females were involved in six incidents, or 13.6 per cent of all incidents which involved females, and 24.0 per cent of all incidents perpetrated against "miscellaneous offices" involved females. The male dominance in this suspect category is probably the result of male numerical dominance in most aspects of business (this is probably especially true of small businesses which do not hire large secretarial pools). Nonetheless, female suspects make up a considerable sector or this suspect category. This female involvement might reflect employee-management grievances by members of the secretarial staff and junior executive corps, often a sizeable sector of the employee population of big business.

The sixth most frequent incident category was that of "single family dwellings." This category, like those mentioned previously, tended to be male dominated. Males perpetrated thirteen of the fourteen suspect sex identifiable incidents; i.e., 5.6 per cent of all incidents which involved males were perpetrated against "single-family dwellings." Only 2.3 per cent of all incidents perpetrated by females were perpetrated against "single family

dwellings." One should also note that 43.3 per cent of all incidents perpetrated against "single family dwellings" were perpetrated by males as compared to 3.3 per cent perpetrated by females. I can only speculate that the violence prone "macho" culture of Texas males fosters this "violent" expression in males while suppressing it in females. This finding is especially interesting when we realize that the female is often the key protagonist in the everyday drama of neighborhood conflicts arising from squabbles with neighbors, neighborhood children, and the ubiquitos door-to-door traveling salesman. Men probably bring their unresolved job and bar related conflicts home with them and decide to resolve them with a malicious phone call (although one apparently resolved his problem with explosives while ten others made use of the fire bomb). It is extremely important and interesting to note that eleven out of thirty-one incidents, or over 33.0 per cent of the incidents involving "single-family dwellings," resulted in an actual act of violence.

"Department stores" ranked seventh with twelve incidents, or 5.2 per cent of all incidents perpetrated by males, and 70.6 per cent of all incidents perpetrated against "department stores" being perpetrated by males. Females were involved in one "department store" incident, or 2.3 per cent of all incidents perpetrated by females, while 5.9 per cent of all "department store" incidents had female suspects. One might speculate that the male dominance in this suspect category is related to management-employee grievances (involving stock workers and sales personnel). Other possible incentives for these incidents might have included the customer-employee relationship during the purchase of an item or the cashing of a check.

Incidents involving "schools" ranked eighth as there were eleven incidents involving males. Thus 4.7 per cent of all incidents which involved males fell within this category and 84.6 per cent of all incidents involving "schools" involved males. Females were known to be involved in one incident; 2.3 per cent of all incidents involving females were within this object category and 7.7 per cent of all sex identifiable incidents involved females. Again, one might suspect employee-management problems (i.e., faculty and staff conflicts with the administration) as well as student reprisals against the administration. One should also note that vengeful citizens and parents often select "public" targets such as schools and hospitals when conflicts arise with a very powerful municipal or public figure or facility.

Incidents involving the "Federal Government" ranked ninth as there were nine incidents which involved male suspects. Of special importance is the fact that women were not identified with any incident involving the "Federal Government." That is, 3.9 per cent of all incidents involving males were associated with this incident category, but 0.0 per cent of all incidents involving females were associated with it. One should also note that 60.0 per cent of all incidents in this object category had male identified suspects. This

is indeed an interesting finding since the popular image of the radical terrorist (bred by the public's knowledge of the SLA and the Weather People) put women squarely in the middle of terrorist activity. Yet, one must recall that most, if not all, incidents were for personal "revenge" rather than a political cause, and that this trend extends to incidents involving the "Federal Government." Possible motivation factors might be employee-management related or customer-client related (e.g., job firing or lay-offs, discourteous or unsatisfactory service).

The tenth most popular incident category for male suspects was the "drive-in-market." Males were involved in seven incidents (3.0 per cent of all male suspects were involved in incidents involving this suspect category while 0.0 per cent of all identified female suspects were associated with this category). Thus one might note that male suspects were identified in 87.5 per cent of all incidents which involved "drive-in-markets." One must turn to the Texas culture to attempt to understand the role of male dominance in this suspect category. I would speculate that males tend to frequent and "hang-out" at these markets more frequently than women. Their parking lots often serve as meeting places for young people. This is a place where young men attempt to be both their age and more than their age, as exemplified by beer drinking and skirt chasing. "Customer-manager" conflicts must be frequent. One might also note that men form a disproportionate share of the service employees hired by these facilities, increasing the possibility of males being involved in "employee-manager" conflicts.

It is especially interesting to note that males were not involved in incidents associated with the arts; i.e., library, music, or theatre. Similarly, females were not associated with any incidents which involved a number of "male" objects; i.e., "vending machine," "business," "federal government," "market drive-ins," and "auto repair shops." Females were, as mentioned earlier, not involved in incidents which involved "restaurants."

BY METHOD

Table 4 reveals that there were six methods by which our suspects perpetrated bombings or bomb threats. This section will answer the question: Do men and women use dissimilar methods in making threats and/or perpetrating bombings?

When there is one suspect – The most common method utilized by male suspects was the "bomb threat." Two-hundred-twenty, or 94.8 per cent of the male suspects, utilized this method, while ten, or 4.3 per cent of the male suspects, utilized "fire bombs" and two, or 0.9 per cent of the male suspects, utilized "explosives." The most common method employed by female suspects was also the "bomb threat." Forty-three, or 97.7 per cent of the

female suspects, employed this method while one female suspect (2.3 per cent of the female suspects) utilized a "fire bomb." Hence, both men and women relied more heavily upon the threat of violence than upon the violence itself. The section entitled *Method* suggested reasons for the reliance on threat rather than violence such as lack of technical knowledge of combustibles and/or explosives, lack of money, or lack of contacts to supply these materials. Men and women appeared to utilize the same methodology, hence similar explanations for the use of the same methodology probably holds true for both sexes. (The same trends and explanations hold true for suspects "unidentified" as to sex.)

When there is more than one suspect – The trends and explanation of the trends offered in the preceding section appears just as relevant for incidents which involved two or more suspects; i.e., the methods utilized were "threats" and "fire bombs," while all suspects were male.

MOTIVE BY AGE

When there is one suspect (estimated age) – Table 11 reveals that most suspects fell within the category "not given or unavailable" with regard to age; i.e., 286 or 73.1 per cent of our suspects. This is understandable when one notes that a bomb threatener might attempt to disguise his voice; it is also understandable considering the fear, panic, and mental anguish experienced by the victim. Nonetheless, if we examine those age categories which are available for our perusal, we are confronted with the following: the largest single "identifiable" age grouping of suspects fell within the twenty to twenty-nine age group, followed by the thirty to thirty-nine age group, and the rather general group labeled "young" (specific age undetermined); i.e., thirty-nine suspects or 10.0 per cent of our total, twenty-one suspects or 5.4 per cent of our total, and seventeen suspects or 4.3 per cent of our total, respectively. Thus, if the age breakdown for those who were "age-identifiable" is reflected in the large group who were not "age-identifiable," we could conclude that bombings and bomb threats were the actions of youthful offenders. Seventy-three of the 105 age-identifiable suspects were under the age of thirty, or, 69.5 per cent of our suspects were found within these age categories. Thus bombings and bomb threats, like violent crimes, tend to be the actions of youthful offenders. It is also important to realize that when the motive behind the bomb threats and bombings was discernible, for these offenders, the motive was usually the same as that of the general populace; i.e., "revenge." Ten of eleven discernible motives for youthful offenders was that of "revenge," while one action was motivated by "profit." Thus, 90.0 per cent of the known motives fell within the "revenge" category.

Table 11. Age (Estimated) by Motive

Motive	*Not Given (Not Available)*	*Under 18*	*18-19*	*20-29*	*30-39*	*40-49*	*50-59*	*70-79*	*Young*	*Elderly*	*Child*	*Middle Age*
Revenge	17	0	3	7	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Profit	5	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subversion/ Sabotage	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	249	8	3	31	16	1	3	2	17	2	2	2
Total	286	9	6	39	21	2	3	2	17	2	2	2
Percent	73.1	2.3	1.5	10.0	5.4	0.5	0.8	0.5	4.3	0.5	0.5	0.5

When there is more than one suspect – There were only four incidents with more than one suspect. When these incidents with multiple suspects did occur, two of the five age-identifiable suspects were under the age of twenty-nine, while the other three were within the thirty to thirty-nine year group.

AGE (ESTIMATED) BY OBJECT

The previous section noted that most age-identifiable suspects were under thirty years of age (69.5 per cent). This section will take cognizance of the objects most frequently threatened or attacked by these individuals as well as those objects threatened or attacked by individuals age thirty to thirty-nine (the age group denoted by the second highest incidence rate).

When one suspect was involved – Nine incidents, or 8.6 per cent of age-identifiable incidents involved youths under the age of eighteen. No trend can be determined about the objects of these incidents other than that eight of the nine objects were public facilities, while the one "non-public" facility was a "single-family dwelling." It is of interest to note that two of the incidents involved objects outside the realm of what might be considered "youth culture"; i.e., they involved the "city government" and the "fire department," see Table 12.[12]

Table 12.

Available upon request.

Six incidents or 5.7 per cent of the age-identifiable incidents involved youths aged eighteen to nineteen. "Single family dwellings" (the object category with the most incidents) were the objects of two incidents. All of the object categories characterized by incidents were squarely within the "youth culture," see Table 12.

Persons aged twenty to twenty-nine committed thirty-nine incidents, or 37.1 per cent of the age-identifiable incidents (our largest age-identifiable category). Five or 12.8 per cent of these incidents were perpetrated against "miscellaneous business offices." The second most frequent object of attack was listed as "miscellaneous," with four incidents, or 10.3 per cent of the age-identifiable incidents committed by this suspect group. "Supermarkets" and "City Government" tied for third, with three incidents or 7.7 per cent of the total. Nine different object categories tied for fourth. These nine object categories reflected a broad spectrum of public facilities with the exception of one private facility, the "single-family dwelling unit." One should note that only three of these nine were the least bit "youth culture" oriented: the

[12] Table 12 is an extremely long table. It is available upon request.

"drive-in market," the "parking lot," and the "school" (all of which serve as youth "hang-outs" at night). The "drive-in market's" parking lot often serves as a gathering place for young people under the age of twenty.

Persons aged thirty to thirty-nine committed twenty-one or 20.0 per cent of the age-identifiable incidents. The most frequent object of attack or threat for this age group was listed as "miscellaneous," with four incidents, or 19.0 per cent of the age-identifiable incidents. The second most frequent object of attack or threat was the "bar" with three incidents, or 14.3 per cent of the age-identifiable incidents committed by this age group. The third most frequent object of attack or threat for this group was the "restaurant" with two incidents or 9.5 per cent of the age-identiable incidents. The remaining categories were extremely diverse, ranging from the "single family dwelling" unit to the "federal government."

The youth categories "child" and "young" composed nineteen or 105 age-identifiable incidents, or 18.1 per cent of this total. The most frequent objects of incidents by youths in this group did not show as strong a relationship to the "youth culture" as did our other "youth" categories. This might in part be due to the inclusion of persons twenty and over in this rather broad category. Nonetheless, when two incidents did occur within an object category, one can note the possible youth-culture association with half of these object categories;ii.e., the "single family dwelling" and "auto repair" were included in this category along with "miscellaneous" and "city-government."

AGE (ESTIMATED) BY METHOD

When there was one suspect – The most common method employed by our suspects was the "bomb threat." Nine suspects, or 2.3 per cent, used "explosives," twenty-three, or 5.9 per cent, used "fire bombs," two suspects used an "undentified substance" and 357 employed the "bomb threat."

Table 13 reveals that the "bomb threat" was the most common method utilized by all of our age "categorized" suspects. The percentage of age "categorized" suspects who utilized the "bomb threat" ranged from a low of 66.7 per cent (the fifty to fifty-nine age group) to 100 per cent (the eighteen to nineteen, forty to forty-nine, seventy to seventy-nine, young, elderly, child, and middle age categories).

When there is more than one suspect – Data reveals that in the cases where there were two suspects, all of the suspects utilized the "bomb threat," regardless of age. In the one case with three suspects, the "fire bomb" was used.

Table 13. Age (Estimated) by Method

Count *Row %* Column % *Total %*	*Age*												
	Not Given	*Under 18*	*18–19*	*20–29*	*30–39*	*40–49*	*50–59*	*70–79*	*Young*	*Elderly*	*Child*	*Middle Age*	*Row Total*
Explosive	7	0.0	0.0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	9
	77.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Fire Bomb	13	2	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23
	56.5	8.7	0.0	30.4	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9
	4.5	22.2	0.0	17.9	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	3.3	0.5	0.0	1.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Unknown	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Bomb Threat	264	8	6	32	19	2	2		17	2	2	2	358
	73.9	2.0	1.7	9.0	5.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	4.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	
	92.3	77.0	100.0	82.1	90.5	100.0	66.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	67.5	1.8	1.5	8.2	4.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	4.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Column	286	10	6	39	21	2	3	2	17	2	2	2	392
Total	73.1	2.4	1.5	10.0	5.4	0.5	0.8	0.5	4.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	100.0

MOTIVE (ACTUAL) BY AGE

When there is one suspect (actual age) – Table 14 reveals that age information on most suspects is either "not given or unavailable." Three-hundred-seventy-four suspects, or 95 per cent of the suspects, were not identified as to age. Data reveals that the twenty to twenty-nine age group contained the largest number of suspects, i.e., 28 per cent of the age-identifiable suspects were within this category. The thirty to thirty-nine year group contained the second largest number of suspects; i.e., four suspects, or 22 per cent. The under eighteen grouping had the third largest number of suspects with three suspects, or 17 per cent. The eighteen to nineteen and seventy to seventy-nine age groups tied for fourth place with two suspects each, or 11 per cent. The forty to forty-nine and fifty to fifty-nine age groups tied for fifth place with one suspect each (6 per cent of the age-identifiable suspects). In brief, this table reveals that ten of the eighteen age-identifiable suspects were under the age of thirty; i.e., 56 per cent of the suspects. The small number of age-identifiable suspects makes it extremely difficult to infer a "youth" orientation in this type of crime. Nonetheless, the tendency toward a youth orientation in the age-identifiable groups within actual age and estimate-age groupings leads one to speculate that bombings and bomb threats appear to be a youth oriented crime.

Table 14 reveals that the motive behind the incident is usually "unknown"; i.e., it was "unknown" in 337, or 85.9 per cent, of the incidents. However, when the motive was known, the most likely motive was "revenge," i.e., "revenge" was the motive in thirty-one or 55 per cent of the fifty-six age-identifiable incidents. "Other," with fourteen incidents, was the second most frequent motive. "Profit" was the third most frequent motive with seven incidents, while "subversion/sabotage" was the least frequent motive category for these age-identifiable persons with three incidents, with per cent totals of 1.8 and 0.8, respectively.

When there is more than one incident – In the three incidents with two suspects, the motives for the incidents were "unknown." The one incident with three suspects was motivated by "revenge." Thus, motive "unknown" and "revenge" remain the most frequent motive categories.

AGE (ACTUAL) BY OBJECT WHEN THERE IS ONE SUSPECT

Table 15 reveals that 374 of the suspects, or 95.4 per cent of the suspects were not age-identifiable. Information on age-identifiable subjects revealed that the twenty to twenty-nine age group had the largest number of suspects; i.e., five suspects or 31 per cent of the age-identifiable suspects. The thirty to thirty-nine age group had the second highest number of suspects with four suspects, or 25 per cent, of the age-identifiable suspects. The under 18

Table 14. Motive by Age (Actual)

Count *Row %* *Column %* *Total %*	*Age*								
	Not Given	*Under 18*	*18–19*	*20–29*	*30–39*	*40–49*	*50–59*	*70–79*	*Row Total*
Revenge	24	0	2	3	2	0	0	0	31
	77.4	0.0	6.5	9.7	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.9
	6.4	100.0	100.0	60.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	6.1	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Profit	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Subversion/Sabotage	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Other	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6
	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 14. (Cont'd.)

Count *Row %* *Column %* *Total %*	*Age*								
	Not Given	*Under 18*	*18–19*	*20–29*	*30–39*	*40–49*	*50–59*	*70–79*	*Row Total*
Unknown	327	3	0	2	1	1	1	2	337
	97.0	0.9	0.0	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	85.9
	87.4	100.0	0.0	40.0	25.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	83.4	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	
Column	374	3	2	5	4	1	1	2	392
Total	95.4	0.8	0.5	1.3	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.5	100.0

age category was third with three suspects, or 19 per cent, of the age-identifiable suspects. The eighteen to nineteen age group was fourth with two suspects or 13 per cent of the age identifiable suspects. The forty to forty-nine and fifty to fifty-nine age groups tied for last with one suspect, or 6 per cent of the age-identifiable suspects, respectively.

In brief, ten of the sixteen age-identifiable suspects were under the age of thirty; i.e., 63 per cent of the age-identifiable suspects were under the age of thirty. Thus, the Actual-Age by Object and Estimated-Age by Object categories both indicated that a disproportionate share of the age-identifiable suspects were under the age of thirty. One must, however, take extreme care in interpreting these findings since such a limited number of suspects were age-identifiable.

The analysis of the data also revealed that the most frequent targets for the twenty to twenty-nine year group were "parking lot," "single-family dwelling," "police-building," "school," and "auto repair." All of these are likely targets for individuals within these age categories, as young people frequent these facilities. It is important to note that no one object category had more than one incident.

Objects of incidents for the thirty to thirty-nine age category were "restaurants," "single-family dwelling," "bar," and "travel agency." Again, no object category had more than one incident, and the possible motives were quite varied. The objects of incidents for our category labeled "under 18" were "school," "restaurant," and "general store." Two of these three categories were, in part, youth oriented; i.e., "school" and "restaurant."

Table 15. Age (Actual)

Age	*Number of Suspects*	*Percentage of Total*
Not Given (Unavailable)	374	95.4
Under 18	3	0.8
18–19	2	0.5
20–29	5	1.3
30–39	4	1.0
40–49	1	0.3
50–59	1	0.3
70–79	2	0.5
Total	392	100.0

"Schools" may house teacher-student conflicts while "restaurants' may foster employee-management problems by hiring unskilled youths as dishwashers, bus-boys, waiters, and waitresses.

The objects of incidents with suspects age eighteen to nineteen were "school" and "general store." The "school," as mentioned, can certainly be considered a youth oriented activity. Customer-management or employee-manager conflicts might account for the occurrence of the "general-store" incident (e.g., youths hired as clerks and sale personnel).

The objects of incidents for the seventy to seventy-nine age group were "travel agency" and "hospital." Both of these object categories clearly fall within the activity space of the elderly; i.e.,

1. the retired often travel and thus utilize "travel agencies," and
2. the elderly often make visits to the "hospital."

It is easy to imagine customer-management conflict at a "travel agency" and just as easy to imagine a patient-administrative conflict resulting from a "hospital" visit (e.g., an overdue bill, the loss of a loved one).

The forty to forty-nine and fifty to fifty-nine age groups were involved in incidents which concerned a "restaurant" and a "garage." The motivations for their actions could easily have been employee-management or customer-management.

When there is more than one suspect – The analysis of the data reveals that the three incidents with two suspects involved suspects who were either unidentifiable as to age or in the twenty to twenty-nine age group.

When the suspects were identified as belonging to the twenty to twenty-nine age group the object was a "clothing store." Again employee-management or customer-management grievances may have been responsible for the threats or bombings.

When the incident involved three suspects, the object of the incident was a "single family" dwelling, one suspect was identified as twenty to twenty-nine, while the other two suspects were in the thirty to thirty-nine age category. Possible reasons for the conflict which resulted in an incident are numerous.

AGE (ACTUAL) BY METHOD

When there is only one suspect – Table 16 reveals that all of the age categories utilized the "bomb threat" more often than any other method except for the twenty to twenty-nine and fifty to fifty-nine age groups. The twenty to twenty-nine age group utilized the "fire bomb" three times and the "bomb threat" twice. The fifty to fifty-nine age group was identified with one incident, an incident involving "explosives." It is interesting to note that neither of the groups was at the extreme on our age continuum. They

Table 16. Age (Actual) by Method

Count *Row %* *Column %* *Total %*	*Age*								
	Not Given (Unavailable)	*Under 18*	*18–19*	*20–29*	*30–39*	*40–49*	*50–59*	*70–79*	*Row Total*
Explosives	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	9
	88.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	2.3
	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	
	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	
Fire Bomb	18	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	23
	78.3	4.3	0.0	13.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9
	4.8	33.3	0.0	60.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	4.6	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Unknown	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Bomb Threat	346	2	2	2	3	1	0	2	357
	96.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.6	91.3
	92.5	66.7	100.0	40.0	75.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	
	88.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.5	
Column	374	3	2	5	4	1	1	2	392
Total	95.3	0.8	0.5	1.3	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.5	100.0

probably could afford to purchase materials and may have had work or military experiences which utilized these materials.

It is also interesting to note that the under eighteen group and the thirty to thirty-nine age group made use of the "fire bomb," a rather primitive but effective method of physical-psychic terror. Young people in Texas learn to drive at an early age and have easy access to soda bottles and gasoline (the same is obviously true for the thirty to thirty-nine age group).

When there is more than one suspect – The three incidents with two suspects utilized the "bomb threat," a tool easily accessible to all ages. The age-category for the suspects in these incidents was either "not given-unavailable" or twenty to twenty-nine.

The one incident with three suspects made use of the "fire bomb." One suspect was not age-identified, but the other two suspects were in the twenty to twenty-nine age category and thus were old enough to have the knowledge to make a "fire bomb" and to have had access to combustibles and a container.

MOTIVE BY METHOD

This section analyzes the association between the specific motives behind threats and attacks and the method of attack or threat associated with a given motive.

The "bomb threat" is the most frequent method utilized by suspects regardless of the motivation behind the incident, see Table 17. This conclusion suggests that the "bomb threat" is a relatively effective outlet for a wide spectrum of motivations as well as a tool easily utilized by suspects of both sexes and all racial/ethnic groups. This finding also suggests that the "psychic terror" associated with the "bomb threat" (in contrast to the physical destructiveness associated with "explosives," "fire bombs," and "combustibles") is seen as an effective method for "squaring" or settling grievances regardless of the grievance.

OBJECT OF ATTACK BY DAY OF WEEK

Incidents tended to increase as the week progressed; i.e., Sunday had the fewest incidents with thirty-one or 7.8 per cent of the incidents, while Friday had the most incidents with seventy-four or 18.7 per cent, see Table 18. It is interesting to note that the number of incidents generally decreased precipitously on Saturday and continued to decrease on Sunday. This decrease might reflect the reduction in commercial-industrial activity on the weekend. However, "super-markets" and "restaurants" are usually open on Sunday, while "restaurants" are usually closed on Mondays (a fact which might be reflected in the small number of incidents on Monday). The closing of a facility for a day or two is relevant if "bomb threat" activity is a "spur of the moment" event; i.e., if it is an attempt to secure immediate

Table 17. Motive by Method

Count *Row %* *Column %* *Total %*	*Motive*					
	Revenge	*Profit*	*Subversion/ Sabotage*	*Other*	*Unknown*	*Row Total*
Explosive	11	1	0	1	6	9
	11.1	11.1	0.0	11.0	66.7	2.3
	3.1	14.3	0.0	7.1	1.8	
	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.3	1.5	
Firebomb	8	0	0	0	16	24
	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	6.1
	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.7	
	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	
Undetermined	0	0	0	0	2	2
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.5
	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	
Bomb Threat	23	6	3	13	316	361
	6.4	1.7	0.8	3.6		
	71.9	85.7	100.0	92.6		
	5.8	1.5	0.8	3.3		
Column	32	7	3	14	339	396
Total	8.1	1.8	0.8	3.5	85.8	100.0

Table 18. Object of Attack by Day of Week

Day	*Number of Incidents*	*Percent of Total for That Day*
Sunday	31	7.8
Monday	48	12.1
Tuesday	65	16.4
Wednesday	68	17.2
Thursday	55	13.9
Friday	74	18.7
Saturday	55	13.9
Total	396	100.0

gratification. Thus, if a facility is closed there is no one to frighten with a "bomb threat." However, the fact that a facility is closed might be a positive factor, a motivational factor in an actual bombing, since detection is less likely and the likelihood of unintentional casualties is decreased.

ACTUAL BOMBINGS: AN ANALYSIS

Method by object – It was noted earlier that actual bombings were rare; i.e., only thirty-five incidents or 8.8 per cent of all recorded incidents involved an actual bombing. Nine of those incidents or 2.3 per cent of all incidents involved "explosives," twenty-four or 6.1 per cent of all incidents involved "fire bombs," and two incidents involved the use of an "undetermined" device. The rarity of an actual bombing probably indicated either that "bomb threats" were seen as an effective and relatively safe form of urban terrorism or that the terrorist (no political connotation intended) lacked the sophistication, courage, contacts (with merchants of explosives and/or combustibles) or financing to engage in actual bombings. One should also recall the reliance on "fire bombs" when actual bombings did take place; i.e., 68.6 per cent of the actual bombings were "fire bombings." The reported frequent usage of this relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated technique supports the speculation offered above in regard to techniques utilized by our suspects.

Method by age (estimated age) when there was one suspect – Thirty-four bombing suspects were individuals whose ages were estimated (either by police at the time of arrest or by a witness who had prior knowledge of the suspect) rather than actually determined.

Age estimates for seven of the nine suspects who utilized "explosives" were unavailable. The age estimates on the other two suspects follow: one

was between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine; the other was between the ages of fifty and fifty-nine. I was unable to determine the age of thirteen of the twenty-three suspects who made use of "fire bombs." Age estimates on the other ten suspects who made use of "fire bombs" were: seven suspects were in the twenty to twenty-nine age grouping, two suspects were under eighteen years of age, and one suspect was between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine. These age estimates suggest that persons who engaged in "fire bombings" tended to be young; i.e., they were generally under thirty years of age. We were unable to determine an age estimate for the two suspects involved in incidents utilizing an "undetermined" device (i.e., an unidentified device).

Method by age (estimated age) when there were two or more suspects – The sex was undetermined for seven of the nine suspects involved in the use of "explosives." The sex of the two "sex determined" suspects was male. The sex was undetermined for twelve of the twenty-three suspects who utilized "fire bombs." Ten of the "sex determined" suspects in this category were male and one was female. Thus, the data clearly revealed that when the sex is determinable, the suspect is very likely to be male; i.e., twelve of thirteen sex-determined suspects of 92.3 per cent of the suspects were male. This finding implies either that males were more likely to engage in bombings than females or that (and this is much less likely) women were more clever in concealing their sexual identity. The American (and Texan) taboo on female participation in aggressive and/or violent behavior supports the former speculation.

Method by sex when there are two or more suspects – All incidents involving two or more suspects involved male suspects. The speculation offered in the preceding section is again suggested to explain the lack of female suspects.

Motive by method – The motive behind six of the nine incidents (66.7 per cent) which involved "explosives" was unknown. However, one incident which involved "explosives" was motivated by "revenge," one was motivated by "profit," and another was motivated by a diverse collection of motives the police classified as "other." It is interesting to note that although the motive behind sixteen of twenty-four, or 66.7 per cent, of the incidents involving "fire bombs" was "unknown," all eight known motives involved "revenge." Incidents in which the method was "undetermined" also involved motives that were "undetermined." In brief, when the motive was known, it was likely to be "revenge"; i.e., 72.7 per cent of the known motives involved "revenge." Thus, "revenge" was the most common motive for incidents involving both threats and actual bombings (when the motive was known).

Time by object by method – What were the most frequent objects of actual bombings? What were the most common methods and at what time did the attacks occur? These were the questions answered in this section.

One should recall that thirty-five incidents or 8.8 per cent of all recorded incidents involved an actual bombing. The most frequent objects of the bombings were "single-family residences." In one of those incidents (i.e., 8.4 per cent of all the bombings against "single-family residences"), "explosives" were used. In the remaining incidents (i.e., 91.6 per cent of the incidents which involved this object category), the "fire bomb" was utilized. The attack in which "explosives" were used took place at 12:00 p.m. (midnight), a time at which a family might be expected to be at home. Thus, one might speculate that the attacker hoped for casualties or to create an atmosphere of extreme terror. The eleven attacks which utilized the "fire bomb" also occurred at times during which the dwellings were likely to be occupied, see Table 19. The speculation offered above for the incident which involved the use of an "explosive" is again suggested.

When noting the time at which a bombing occurred, one might determine whether or not the structure was likely to be occupied. One might further speculate as to whether the bombing was intended primarily as an act of "psychic terror" rather than physical destruction. The analysis of our bomb data revealed that all of the "fire bombings" of the "single-family dwellings" occurred when residents were not usually away from the home at school, at work, or at play. These findings suggest two motivational theories. The first is that the bombers attacked those structures during the hours they expected the residents to be at home. Such an attack could be considered a threat (i.e., an act of "psychic terror") since the "fire bomb" was utilized, rather than "explosives." One must recall that "fire bombs" are often easy to detect and extinguish or deactivate. The damage due to a "fire bombing" is often minor, especially if detected early, while high intensity "explosives" can cause tremendous damage in an extremely short period of time. A second interpretation suggested by the times of the "fire bombings" of those homes would be that the perpetrators of those bombings lacked the technical sophistication to utilize high "explosives" or lacked access to such "explosives." Consequently, they used what was at hand and hoped for the worst.

In contrast to the large number of attacks against "single-family dwellings" (twelve incidents), there were only two attacks against an "apartment complex." This finding suggests that the motive behind the bombing of residences was personal "revenge" rather than anti-capitalist terrorism.

The second most frequent objects of actual bombings were "bars"; i.e., four or 11.4 per cent of all actual bombings were against "bars." "Explosives" were used in one incident; "fire bombs" were used in two of the incidents; and the device used in the fourth incident was listed as "undetermined"

Table 19. Time by Object by Method for Actual Bombings

Object of Attack	Attacks		Method		
	Count	Percent	Explosive Time	Fire Bomb Time	Not Available Time
Single Family Residence	12	34.3	One attack 12:00 p.m.	Two attacks 4:00 a.m. One attack 6:00 p.m. Two attacks 9:00 p.m. Two attacks 10:00 p.m. Two attacks 11:00 p.m. Two attacks 12:00 p.m.	—
Bar	4	11.4	One attack 1:00 a.m.	One attack 4:00 a.m. One attack 4:00 p.m.	One attack 2:00 p.m.
Small Market	3	8.6	One attack 3:00 a.m. One attack 7:00 p.m.	One attack 7:00 a.m.	—
Police Building	2	5.7	One attack 11:00 a.m.	One attack 1:00 a.m.	—
Apartment	2	5.7	One attack 11:00 p.m.	One attack 12:00 p.m.	—
Parking	2	5.7	—	One attack 2:00 a.m. One attack 10:00 p.m.	—
School	1	2.9	—	One attack 3:00 p.m.	—
Factory	1	2.9	—	One attack 9:00 p.m.	—
Garage	1	2.9	One attack 3:00 a.m.	—	—
Yard	1	2.9	—	One attack 11:00 p.m.	

(unknown). The "explosive" was activated at 1:00 a.m., a busy hour for this type of establishment. The "fire bombings" occurred at 4:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. The bombing which utilized an "undetermined" substance occurred at 2:00 p.m. Both of the "fire bombings" occurred during hours when few customers are present. Thus one might speculate that the motive behind the bombings was that of personal "revenge."

"Small markets" were the third most frequent objects of attack, with three incidents or 8.6 per cent of all the actual bombings. Two of the three incidents utilized "explosives" while the third was a "fire bombing." The "explosives" were detonated at 3:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. No dominant pattern of motives was discernable with regard to the explosions. One of the bombings might have resulted in deaths or injuries, but the other, the 3:00 a.m. explosion, occurred when few if any customers would be around. The desire to avoid detection and casualties probably accounts for the timing of the 7:00 "fire bombing."

Three objects tied for fourth place in regard to frequency of attack: "police building," "parking lot," and "apartment." "Explosives" were used in one of the attacks against the "police building" at 11:00 a.m., while the other "police building" attack was a "fire bombing" at 1:00 a.m. These two made up 5.7 per cent of all actual bombings. The timing of the attacks against the "police building" as well as the devices used suggest that the perpetrators hoped for more than "psychic terror" or structural damage. The goal was, in part, to inflict casualties.

Both attacks against "apartments" occurred at night, at 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 p.m., times at which the structures were likely to be occupied. One of these attacks utilized "explosives" while the other was a "fire bombing." I believe, again, that casualties as well as "psychic terror" and structural damage were intended.

The two "parking lot" incidents involved "fire bombings." One incident occurred at 2:00 a.m., while the other occurred at 1:00 p.m. Thus, both occurred at times of light usage. This might indicate an act of personal "vengence" ("revenge") and a desire to cause structural damage.

Four objects experienced a single attack, thus tying for last place: "school," "factory," "yard," and "garage." The "school" incident occurred at 3:00 p.m., the "factory" incident at 9:00 p.m., and the "yard" incident at 11:00 p.m. All three incidents involved "fire bombing" at a time of light usage. "Fire bombings" at such a time could have resulted in extensive structural damage to the "factory" and the "school," but the possibility of casualties was minor. The "yard" incident probably would have resulted in "psychic terror" if the "yard" was adjacent to a dwelling. All three acts could very well have been, and appeared to be, acts of personal "revenge." The attack against the "garage" was at 3:00 a.m. and utilized "explosives."

Again, the possibility of casualties was light and personal "revenge" appeared to be a likely motive.

Summary

The relationship among a wide variety of variables and the occurrence of bombings, bomb threats, and incendiaries in Dallas for the year 1975 is examined. Included among the findings are the following:

1. only 8.8 per cent of the reported incidents (N = 396) actually resulted in a bombing and/or incendiary, with very few casualties resulting,
2. revenge was the most common motive
3. public buildings, business offices, and residential structures were the primary locations for the incidents,
4. the ethnic/racial characteristics of 43.6 per cent of the suspects could not be determined,
5. females tended to be underrepresented in the suspect category when the sex of the suspect could be determined, and
6. bombings, incendiaries, and bomb threats were the actions of youthful offenders.

Additional detailed findings, not presented here, are available upon request. For an unabridged version of these findings, contact Dr. Daniel E. Georges at the Graduate School of Criminal Justice, the State University of New York at Albany.

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