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<Publisher>
	<PublisherInfo>
		<PublisherName>Baywood Publishing Company</PublisherName>
	</PublisherInfo>
	<Journal>
		<JournalInfo JournalType="Journals">
			<JournalPrintISSN>2167-7816</JournalPrintISSN>
			<JournalElectronicISSN>2167-7824</JournalElectronicISSN>
			<JournalTitle>Journal of Collective Negotiations (formerly Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector)</JournalTitle>
			<JournalCode>BWCN</JournalCode>
			<JournalID>300318</JournalID>
			<JournalURL>http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&amp;id=300318</JournalURL>
		</JournalInfo>
		<Volume>
			<VolumeInfo>
				<VolumeNumber>21</VolumeNumber>
			</VolumeInfo>
			<Issue>
				<IssueInfo IssueType="Regular">
					<IssueNumberBegin>2</IssueNumberBegin>
					<IssueNumberEnd>2</IssueNumberEnd>
					<IssueSupplement>0</IssueSupplement>
					<IssuePartStart>0</IssuePartStart>
					<IssuePartEnd>0</IssuePartEnd>
					<IssueSequence>000021000219920601</IssueSequence>
					<IssuePublicationDate>
						<CoverDate Year="1992" Month="6" Day="1"/>
						<CoverDisplay>Number 2/1992</CoverDisplay>
					</IssuePublicationDate>
					<IssueID>LBL9G82Q9GT8</IssueID>
					<IssueURL>http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=issue&amp;id=LBL9G82Q9GT8</IssueURL>
				</IssueInfo>
				<Article ArticleType="Original">
					<ArticleInfo Free="No" ESM="No">
						<ArticleDOI>10.2190/XFLC-PPL3-BB42-MT5U</ArticleDOI>
						<ArticlePII>XFLCPPL3BB42MT5U</ArticlePII>
						<ArticleSequenceNumber>0</ArticleSequenceNumber>
						<ArticleTitle Language="En">THE ARBITRATION OF DISCIPLINARY MATTERS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: DOES OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?</ArticleTitle>
						<ArticleFirstPage/>
						<ArticleLastPage/>
						<ArticleHistory>
							<RegistrationDate>20020509</RegistrationDate>
							<ReceivedDate>20020509</ReceivedDate>
							<Accepted>20020509</Accepted>
							<OnlineDate>20020509</OnlineDate>
						</ArticleHistory>
						<FullTextURL>http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&amp;id=XFLCPPL3BB42MT5U</FullTextURL>
						<Composite>2</Composite>
					</ArticleInfo>
					<ArticleHeader>
						<AuthorGroup>
							<Author>
								<GivenName>MASHALAH RAHNAMA-MOGHADAM, DAVID A. DILTS, AND AHMAD KARIM</GivenName>
								<Initials/>
								<FamilyName/>
								<Degrees/>
								<Roles/>
							</Author>
						</AuthorGroup>
						<Abstract Language="En">This article presents the results of a study of published arbitration awards from public sector labor disputes concerning disciplinary matters. The hypothesis tested is that employers prevail more frequently in absenteeism matters than they do in cases where less objective evidence is available, such as insubordination. The examination of public sector arbitration awards supports this hypothesis. Unions win a majority of insubordination cases, whereas employers win a majority of absenteeism cases. This suggests that in cases which turn on objective evidence the burden of proof is more easily discharged.</Abstract>
					</ArticleHeader>
				</Article>
			</Issue>
		</Volume>
	</Journal>
</Publisher>
