Journal Facts

Journal
Journal of Collective Negotiations
ISSN
2167-7816 (print) 2167-7824 (electronic)
Volume
23
Issue
3
Date
9/1/1994

Article Facts

Title
THE COMPLAINING GAME: HOW EFFECTIVE IS COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION?
DOI
10.2190/U043-JM5T-0L2Q-JUE2
Author
JOSEPH B. ROSE
Online Date
05/09/2002

Article Links

THE COMPLAINING GAME: HOW EFFECTIVE IS COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION?

JOSEPH B. ROSE

DOI: 10.2190/U043-JM5T-0L2Q-JUE2

Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of compulsory interest arbitration by analyzing more than 4,000 settlements in Ontario, Canada for the period 1982-1990. The research is based on a comparison of the performance of arbitration system with strike-based systems in the private and public sectors and a system featuring a choice of procedures. The results indicate arbitration protects the public interest by preventing strikes. At the same time, it shows public sector workers with the right to strike infrequently resort to work stoppages and those without the right to strike are prone to redirect industrial conflict. Relative to other bargaining systems, arbitration inhibits genuine collective bargaining and experiences protracted delays in achieving settlements. The availability of arbitration appears safeguard employee interests by producing wage settlements that are comparable to or superior to wage settlements elsewhere.

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