10.2190/3451-2NJM-VGE6-EN7C 34512NJMVGE6EN7C 21 LABOR NEGOTIATIONS AND GAME THEORY: THE CASE OF ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING POWER 21 32 20060727 20060727 20060727 20060727 34512NJMVGE6EN7C.pdf http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id=34512NJMVGE6EN7C 1 LAWRENCE J. HABER Indiana-Purdue University at Fort Wayne Recent labor negotiations suggest that game-theory models can be used to analyze a wide range of labor relations situations. This article presents examples of how the Prisoner's Dilemma game can be extended to highlight the incentives present in many contract negotiations, including sports. Examples are the successful asymmetric bargaining power applied to the Major League Baseball Players Association contract talks in 2002, and the problem-filled National Hockey League Players Association negotiations of 2004, which are likened to a game of Chicken, and in which it was unclear whether one side held an advantage over the other.