10.2190/CN.32.3.a 433H771V2430K248 1 Labor Negotiations, Misperceptions, and Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Some Extensions and Afterthoughts 173 187 20090205 20090205 20090205 20090205 433H771V2430K248.pdf http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id=433H771V2430K248 3 Lawrence J. Haber Nicholas Malin-Adams Joseph N. Khamalah Nodir Adilov Indiana University - Purdue University, Fort Wayne Extending previous work of three of the authors [3], this study assumes that parties playing tit-for-tat in labor negotiations (modeled as Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma) may have different probabilities of misperceiving one another's moves. Also, the probability of misperceiving a friendly move may be greater than that of misperceiving an unfriendly move. Through simulation, greater perceptive ability by a player is shown to convey no competitive advantage although it may raise joint payoffs. Further, as the probability of misperceiving an unfriendly move as friendly converges to zero, average returns to the players become negligible. These results' behavioral implications are explored. L. J. Haber and J. Wellington, Public-Sector Collective Bargaining: Lessons from Game Theory, <i>Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector</i>, 30:2, pp. 149-157, 2003. A. K. Dixit and B. J. Nalebuff, <i>Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics and Everyday Life</i>, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, pp. 106-115, 1991. L. J. Haber, N. Malin-Adams, and J. N. Khamalah, Labor Negotiations, Misperceptions, and Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Simulation, <i>Journal of Collective Negotiations</i>, 32:2, 101-115.