10.2190/G350-1H17-5227-4421 G3501H1752274421 1 Disparate Impact Discrimination and the ADEA: Coming of Age 99 117 20070402 20070402 20070402 20070402 G3501H1752274421.pdf http://baywood.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id=G3501H1752274421 2 Debra D. Burke Le Von E. Wilson Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA Although the theory of disparate impact discrimination was not initially cognizable under Title VII, the Supreme Court in <i>Griggs v. Duke Power Company</i> recognized its viability [1]. Prior to <i>Griggs</i>, individuals could only make a claim under Title VII if they could prove disparate treatment, which occurs when an employer intentionally treats members of a protected class less favorably because of their status in that class. Disparate impact discrimination occurs when an employer's facially neutral employment practice adversely affects a person in a protected class, and that fact cannot be explained by business necessity. While disparate impact actions have been recognized under the Civil Rights Act since 1971, the circuit courts disagreed whether this theory of discrimination applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. This article examines the 2005 Supreme Court decision that recognized the ADEA authorizes recovery in disparate impact cases.